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The current report is a consulting project elaborated for SIMA (Servicios Industriales 
de la Marina S.A.). The aim of the study is to analyze the company, focusing on SIMA 
Callao and generate a report on current problems and an assessment of possible solutions. 
The main problem SIMA Callao struggles with is low profitability.  As they are a state-
owned company, they carry out most of their work for the government, securing only 
sufficient funds to cover costs. For this reason, SIMA would become more profitable if it 
they take up more contracts with private clients, most particularly in the ship repair sector 
which offers higher contribution margins.  Other secondary problems include, instability of 
the workforce (naval officers with short contracts), lack of managerial skills, inflexible labor 
force, inadequate wage and promotion policy, lack of a supplier's payment policy, 
insufficient and obsolete infrastructure, among others. 
SIMA Callao should use their increased capacity to serve private clients and shift 
their focus to ship repair in order to improve the company profitability. In addition, 
adjustments in the HR, procurement and finance need to be made to achieve both stability 
and efficiency in the company.  With these changes set in place, it is expected to raise 
SIMA's annual profit to 5-6%. Opposition from SIMA’s direction is expected. However, it is 
important to understand the social benefits that will be generated with an improved 
profitability: new jobs would be created and a multiplier effect would be generated when 









El presente informe es un proyecto de consultoría elaborado para SIMA (Servicios 
Industriales de la Marina S.A.). El objetivo del estudio es analizar a la empresa, centrándose 
en SIMA Callao y generar un informe sobre los problemas y plantear posibles soluciones.  El 
principal problema de SIMA Callao es la baja rentabilidad. Ya que son una empresa estatal, 
llevan a cabo la mayor parte de su trabajo para el gobierno, los cuales no generan ganancias. 
Por esta razón, SIMA podría generar una mayor rentabilidad tomando contratos con clientes 
privados, especialmente en el sector de reparación que ofrece mayores márgenes de 
contribución. Otros problemas secundarios incluyen, inestabilidad de la mano de obra 
(oficiales navales con contratos de corta duración), falta de capacidad de gestión, fuerza 
laboral inflexible, inadecuada política salarial y de promoción, falta de una política de pago 
de proveedores, infraestructura insuficiente y obsoleta, entre otros más. 
SIMA debería utilizar la nueva capacidad para atender al sector privado y cambiar el 
foco de sus operaciones a la unidad de reparaciones navales para mejorar la rentabilidad de la 
empresa. Asimismo, son necesarios ajustes en las políticas de recursos humanos, 
adquisiciones y finanzas. Con estos cambios, se espera elevar el margen neto de SIMA entre 
5% y 6%. Se espera cierta oposición por parte de la  dirección del SIMA. Por ello, es 
importante resaltar los beneficios sociales que se generarán con los cambios propuestos: la 
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Chapter I: General Situation of the Organization 
1.1. The Company  
1.1.1 History  
Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA) is a Peruvian state-owned company with 
experiences over 170 years. Founded in 1845, the company focuses on developing strategic 
activities related to national security and defense. They were created to provide shipbuilding 
and technical services to the Peruvian Navy (SIMA Memoria Annual, 2015). The first 
shipyard was established in Callao Province in Lima, and then this was followed by the 
construction of a similar, but smaller, location in Iquitos in 1864. This last project sought to 
create development in one of the most unexplored regions of Peru: The Amazon (Servicios 
Industriales de la Marina, 2012a). 
SIMA was contracted to build ships and armaments for the navy during the War of 
the Pacific in 1879.  The shipyard was destroyed after the war and only operated to repair 
small-size vessels. In 1938, the dry dock was inaugurated in Callao to serve large sea vessels. 
In addition, the company entered into the shipbuilding business, and began constructing 
vessels for the private sector. Later on, in 1958, SIMA constructed BAP Zorritos of 6,000 
dead weight tonnage (DWT), which was the largest in Latin America at that time. Additional 
docks and pipe workshops were created as a result of their increasing demand.  The shipyard 
began regularly constructing four large vessels at a time with capacities of up to 12,000 tons 
(Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2012a). 
During the 1970's, SIMA became one of the leading shipyards in the region, 
delivering one large vessel every year, which was a very competitive construction period. 
Moreover, a significant merger between SIMA and Servicio Industrial de Iquitos (SIDI) 
enhanced the building capacity for the company. In 1975, they built a new structural 
boilermaker complex in Chimbote, where they focused on metalworking. In 1982, SIMA 
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built their first warships for the west coast region. Over the past few years, the company 
developed incremental technological innovations, and expanded their docks in Callao. Due to 
the continuous developments, the company was able to achieve international certifications in 
quality including the IMS, ISO 9001 and another certificates that guarantee the quality of 
their services (Servicios Industriales de la Marina,, 2012a). 
1.1.2 Vision, mission, strategic objectives  
Vision. “Be recognized as the best shipyard in Latin America and become pride of the 
Peruvian industry” (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2016). 
Mission. The Industrial Services Marine SA, main shipyard in Peru, carries out the 
maintenance, modernization and construction of the Peruvian Navy's ships and executes 
projects related to shipbuilding and mechanical metal for the state and private sector, national 
and abroad, with the most stringent quality standards, in order to contribute to the national 
defense and the socio-economic and technological development of the country  (Servicios 
Industriales de la Marina, 2016). 
Strategic objectives. The primary objective of SIMA is to serve the interests of the 
Peruvian Navy and other state entities by developing the naval industry and complementary 
businesses. It is also in charge of promoting the social, cultural, professional and technical 
development of their employees. Additionally, SIMA serves the private sector in order to 
bolster their profitability so that they can reinvest in the business  (Servicios Industriales de la 
Marina,  2016). 
1.1.3 Business units 
Shipbuilding. Shipbuilding is one of the most critical business units at SIMA Peru. 
SIMA has built ships for over fifty years with experts and engineers from specialized sectors 
to ensure high quality in addition to client satisfaction. The size of the shipyard allows the 
company to build different sizes of vessels: tug boats, fishing boats, personnel carrier 
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motorboats, naval units, large ocean liners, etc. The main shipbuilding operation is located in 
Callao and has an area 300,000 m
2 
including docks and berths. The shipyard can receive 
ships up to 50,000 DWT. Meanwhile shipbuilding in Chimbote is for building small boats.  
The one in Iquitos provides berths and docks, which is capable of building personal carrier 
motorboats, tanker barges, aluminum and steel ships  (Servicios Industriales de la Marina,  
2012b). 
Ship repair. The ship repairs division is the core business of SIMA Peru. SIMA 
provides maintenance and engineering services for vessels and fishing ships. Although 
SIMA's principal client and priority is the Peruvian Navy, SIMA Callao also repairs for 
clients with dry docks for ships up to 25,000 DWT.  Their ship repair services include 
sandblasting, hull, propulsion and steering system repair, boiler making works, and 
maintenance of diesel engines. Its principal client in this unit is the government. SIMA has a 
good quality of facilities and an experienced team. This allows SIMA to be able to serve local 
clients and international sectors  (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2012b).  
Metalworking. SIMA Peru is also well-known for its activities in the metalworking 
sector. Over the years, SIMA became involved with the construction of infrastructures 
(especially bridges) across the country. Even though metalworking is not the core business of 
SIMA, the company is able to work on different projects in Peru's infrastructure. The 
metalworking unit is divided into four different segments: steel bridges, gates, pressure pipes 
and various structures (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2012b). One of the most common 
contracts carried out by this unit is constructing of bridges. SIMA has built 90% of bridges in 
the country. Those bridges are located in dangerous or undeveloped areas of the country, and 
SIMA is one of the only company that has the resources needed to develop those 
infrastructures (Novoa, personal communication, July 7, 2016). 
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After 30 years of conducting business in the metalworking industry, SIMA has now 
distinguished themselves as the leading expert. SIMA metalworking is performed in the three 
operation centers located in Callao, Chimbote and Iquitos. They have processing capacity 
which exceeds 8,000 tons of steel a year.  With this capacity, they are able to supply 
metalworking goods to small and large engineering projects in any region of the country or 
even abroad (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2012b). 
Weapons and Electronics. SIMA also has divisions in the weapons and electronics 
design industry. The company has a microelectronics design center and creates sonar, radars, 
automated control systems, etc. SIMA is the only service representative in Peru which allow 
them to “perform certified way maintenance of radars, turns and navigation equipment in 
Units Surface Marina de Guerra del Peru and individual work mainly in merchant and fishing 
vessels.”   The main site for weapons and electronics operations’ is located in Callao 
(Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2012b). 
1.1.4 Structure  
As every state-owned company, SIMA's priority is to service the country and society. 
Although it is part of the Defense Minister and regulated by FONOFE, SIMA maintains a 
private administration and has an administrative, economic and financial autonomy, which is 
led by the board directors (composed by Peruvian Navy Generals). Additionally, the 
government focus and the short-term orientation of SIMA, makes it impossible to implement 
process and client management orientation. Many of the officers lack the administrative, 
managerial and technical skills that are required for the industry. Their military way of doing 
things with strictly hierarchical organization obstructs communication and decision making. 
Additionally, officers usually only serve the company for two years, which is too short to 
manage the company and implement changes (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2008a).  
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1.2.  The Shipbuilding and Maintenance Industry 
1.2.1 Industry information 
The shipbuilding industry. During the last century, thanks to the escalation of 
technology and economic trade agreements, international commerce has increased 
considerably. For centuries, sea logistic services had been the only means of international 
transportation. Today, despite the appearance of air logistics, maritime transportation still 
accounts for 80% of the global trade (United Nations Conference of Trade Development, 
2013). Figure 1 shows the evolution of global trade, seaborne trade and global GDP. The 
maritime transportation preponderance should be noted in relation to the global 
trade.  Additionally, the figure shows the stretch correlation between the shipping industry 
(seaborne shipments) and the global economy. 
 
Figure 1. World seaborne trade evolution in comparison to the world merchandise trade, 
world GDP and OECD industrial production index from 1975 to 2012 (1990=100).  
Data are from “Recent developments and trends in international maritime transport affecting 




The shipbuilding industry started to become of national interest after the Second 
World War. The governments noted the importance of this industry for international 
commerce, the number of workers that it could employ, the supported industries that could be 
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bolstered and the need for manufacturing and repairing national vessels (Gerasimou, 
2014).  As with many other strategic sectors, the shipbuilding industry has been subsidized 
for long periods in order to maintain its competitiveness. Today Japanese, Chinese, Korean 
and Spanish industries receive government support. The Chinese subsidies during the period 
2006-2012, reduced the shipyard costs by 15-20%, and this allowed them to increase their 
global market share (Kalouptsidi, 2014). 
During the last years, the shipbuilding sector has been facing difficult times because 
of the relation it has with the global economy.  Before 2008, the industry had been growing at 
exponential rates (The Naval Architect, 2010). The sales' peak was reached in 2007, with 
169.6 million of new orders.  However, ever since the global financial crisis, the industry has 
entered in a depression, reaching its lowest peaks of 33.6 M and 38 M orders in 2009 and 
2012 respectively (The Shipbuilder's Association of Japan, 2016). The evolution of 
shipbuilding orders is presented in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. World new shipbuilding orders total and by markets (1990-2015).  




With the shipping industry being affected by financial crisis, the demand for new 
vessels decreased. However, this industry recovered rapidly and continued growing from 
2010 onwards. Figure 3 shows the historic levels of seaborne trade since 1990 divided by 
industry. Furthermore, the weak financial market affected the shipbuilding industry, and 
limited credit services for producers and buyers. Finally, the falling oil prices worsened the 
situation, since producers started cancelling orders for drill ships (Ji-Eun, 2015).  
 
Figure 3. World seaborne trade (1990-2015).  
Data are from “Shipbuilding Statistics”, The Shipbuilder's Association of Japan, 2016 
(http://www.sajn.or.jp/e/statistics/Shipbuilding_Statistics_Mar2016e.pdf). 
  
Moreover, new competitors coming from low labor cost countries have reconfigured 
the shipbuilding market. During the post war era, the industry was dominated by the US and 
Europe. However, due to the intensive-labor characteristics of the industry, the production 
moved to low-wage countries, located mainly in Asia (The Naval Architect, 2010). Currently 
the production is concentrated in the Korean, Chinese and Japanese shipyards (SIMA-Peru, 
2016). China and Korea lead the production with 33% and 30.9% of market share, followed 
by Japan with 26.9%. This leaves Europe with 3.7% and the rest of the world with 5.6% (The 
Shipbuilder's Association of Japan, 2016).  
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Other emerging nations who have entered the shipbuilding industry are Brazil, India, 
Malaysia and Vietnam. One recent trend in the industry is that shipping companies are also 
investing in shipyards as an integration strategy to gain control of the whole supply chain 
(Global Industry Analysts, 2012). Additionally, some shipbuilders are outsourcing the 
construction process of parts to producers of countries with lower costs. Finally, a last trend 
related to the increasing steel prices, is the possible integration between shipbuilders and steel 
producers (SIMA-Peru, 2016). 
The declining demand of ship orders after the financial crisis, along with the 
increasing competition, have caused an oversupply and excess of capacity in the world's 
shipbuilding industry. Shipbuilders around the world have lowered their prices to attract 
buyers, obtaining little profits or even incurring in a loss just to keep operations going 
(Zhiming, 2016).  The figures in the shipping industry are similar, with 50% of loss-making 
enterprises during the last three years (Hellenic Shipping News, 2015). 
The ship repair industry. There are three types of repair services: conversion or 
reconstruction, repair of damages, and maintenance. According to Mackenzie’s 2004 report 
(as cited in SIMA-Peru, 2016) the last category represents in average 75% of the total sales of 
these three services. Ships must undergo periodic maintenance every two to three years to 
keep their vessels operable and up to standards. Additionally, sometimes shipyards receive 
unscheduled ships related with unexpected issues.  
The size of the shipyards varies from larger companies with international presence to 
small yards with regional and local presence (SIMA-Perú, 2016). In the last years, the 
industry has been favored by the increasingly aging number of vessels and the decision of 
owners to increase their lifespan. Repair is less costly to owners than buying new vessels. 
Finally, environmental accidents and regulations have increased the pressure to improve 
maintenance frequency (“Shipbuilding and Repairing”, 2016). 
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According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008), 
shipbuilding and ship repair businesses are complementary industries, enabling many 
shipbuilders to counteract the effects of their cyclical and capital intensive business. These 
two activities share many of the same types of equipment and infrastructure needed to carry 
out in the same yard. Some of the facilities that are equally shared between the two industries 
are: painting, the pipe and steel division, berths, warehouse and lifting installations.  
Numerical data and statistics about the ship repair business is limited. However, there 
is data available from the Japanese industry that suggest that this business is much smaller 
than shipbuilding in monetary sales.  Historically, from the total sales of Japanese shipyards, 
the repair business has represented between 4.1% and 24% (The Shipbuilder's Association of 
Japan, 2016). Figure 4 shows the evolution of sales of both businesses from 1990. 
Additionally, this industry has similarly been affected by the global financial crises. It is 
shown in Figure 5 that the European repair and maintenance markets decreased in 25% in 
2008, even more than shipbuilding, which fell to 10% (Eurostat, 2015).  
 
Figure 4. New building and repair sales of Japanese SAJ members. 




Figure 5. Annual growth rates of shipbuilding and repairing from EU 28. 





Most ship owners program their maintenance services in ports along their routes; 
deviation is uncommon nowadays.  Generally, the cost of the service is the determining 
criteria, though many clients also consider the quality of the repair and the steel which is 
used. Within every ship route, there are cheaper areas:  Poland and the Baltic States in 
northern Europe, Turkey and the Balkan States in the Mediterranean/Southern Europe and 
China in Asia (which is the cheapest worldwide).  During the past two decades, Singapore 
has become the leader in the repair industry.  However, China has been recently increasing its 
market share by offering lower prices. The Chinese shipbuilding industry is favored not only 
by their cheap labor but by the steel production, which is also subsidized at US$1.00/kg 
compared with Singapore's price over $2.00/kg (Thorpe, n.d.). 
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1.2.2 Key successful factors (KSFs) 
There are several key success factors which characterize the shipbuilding and repair 
industry. First, the number of ships the company builds or gives services, factors directly into 
their overall success (Lorange, 2008). By having a large number of vessels, the company will 
have a stronger bargaining power with their suppliers. Also, by having different ships, the 
company will improve their maintenance skills.  
Second, especially for the repair business cost and location are fundamental aspects. 
Ship owners would look for cheap shipyards that are located along their routes to reduce time 
and costs. However, in the shipbuilding industry, many clients consider quality and the steel 
which is used (Thorpe, n.d.). For instance, shipyards with ISO’s certifications and which are 
environmentally responsible have higher demand.  
In addition, an excellent location can guarantee not only an efficient shipping process 
but also the volume that a shipyard can get. For instance, the location and connectivity of 
nearer ports are essential to guarantee a strong demand of repair services. The connectivity 
index would be explained later in Chapter VIII. Finally, it is crucial for a shipping company 
to diversify their services. Diversification in the marine industry allows companies to achieve 
long-term success. For instance, it is essential to offer maintenance services, to counteract 
shipbuilding’s seasonality.  
All in all, as a state-owned company, SIMA also has unique KSFs.  They have a great 
experience, an excellent reputation, sufficient funds and one of the cheapest labor costs of the 
region. Also, during the last 30 years, SIMA has accumulated reliable experience at 
metalworking. This is a strong resource to the shipbuilding and ship maintenance industry. 
1.3  Industry Attractiveness 
Michael Porter's model aim to assess the attractiveness of an industry by analyzing 
five different forces, which shapes the overall market and its key players. 
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1.3.1 Threat of new entrants 
The threat of new entrants is low. In the shipbuilding and maintenance industry, the 
barriers to entry are extremely high mainly because of the required initial investment. First, 
the capital cost of building a shipyard is extremely high and finding a proper location is 
difficult. Second, the construction of a ship is a long and complicated process and involve 
extensive investment and intensive workforce. Third, it also requires high technical expertise 
and experienced engineers. Fourth, the main raw material, steel, is unstable since the market 
prices fluctuate often (Kakatkar, A, 2009).  
However, even though the threat of new entrants is low, the industry has grown in the 
last few decades with new key players who are challenging incumbents. For instance, the 
China Shipping Industry Co. was founded in 1998 and is now a leader in the shipbuilding and 
maintenance market (China Shipping Industry Co., 2009). For a long time, South Korea 
dominated the cost-competitive commercial shipbuilding. However, due to the high 
investment from the Chinese government in their shipbuilding industry, China is becoming 
the biggest threat for incumbents (School, 2015). 
Also, there is a shift in the global business world towards sustainability, and it will 
affect the shipping industry. For instance, “The International Maritime Organization is 
discussing regulations that may force ships to belch out less carbon dioxide and has 
introduced tighter limits on other pollutants” (The Economist, 2010). These strict regulations 
could deter newcomers from entering this risky and highly competitive industry.  
1.3.2 Threat of substitutes 
The threat of substitutes is medium – low. It could be argued that the threat of 
substitutes depends on the type of ships. For instance, commercial ships are threatened by 
airplanes; however, air transport is much more expensive than using container shipping for 
transport. However, pipeline could be a better alternative over maritime transportation since 
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it is safer and relatively inexpensive (School, 2015). Finally, the shipbuilding and 
maintenance businesses that operate in a niche industry, allows them to be protected from a 
threat of substitutes (Olsen, 2016).  
1.3.3 Bargaining power of buyers 
The bargaining power of buyers is relatively high. First, there are few buyers in this 
industry and they are price sensitive. Also, the changing prices for buyers is insignificant, 
especially during exchange fluctuation periods.  Due to the high expensive prices of this 
industry, the buyers retain a lot of bargaining power. Finally, due to the excess of capacity 
and decreasing demand, the power of clients has increased in the last few years (Nam Sung, 
2009). 
1.3.4 Bargaining power of suppliers 
The bargaining power of suppliers is medium - low. The most important material is 
steel, which is a commodity. Therefore, suppliers cannot influence the price very much. 
Additionally, there are a great number of steel manufacturers, so the changing cost of 
suppliers remains low. Additionally, some parts of the ships are not manufactured by the 
repair company. Rather, they are supplied by part manufacturers. The concentration of this 
industry is low (Nam Sung, 2009). Finally, some components like navigation systems and 
ships engines are outsourced from specialized companies, which have a medium power of 
negotiation (Kakatkar, 2009). 
1.3.5 Competitive rivalry 
Based on Porter's forces analysis, the rivalry among competitors in the shipbuilding 
and maintenance industry is high. It is highly concentrated in various regions, with Asia as 
the largest producer.  As it can be observed in Figure 6, production is concentrated in China, 
South Korea and Japan. For instance, the five largest firms are located: Hyundai Heavy Ind 
(South Korea), Daewoo (South Korea), China State Shipbuilding Corp. (China), Samsung 
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Figure 6. Largest shipbuilding nations in 2015, based on completions in gross tonnage (in 
1,000s).  




Figure 7. The top five world shipyards by market value.  
Data are from “Infographic”, World Maritime News, 2016 
(http://worlmaritimenews.com/archives185935/infographic-top-5-shipyards). 
 
Also, according to the US Bureau of Labor Statistic, the shipbuilding and repair “rank 
among the most hazardous industries in the world” (Stellman, 1998). Additionally, the 
industry is characterized by different ship buildings: commercial, army vessel, submarines, 
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etc. Therefore, the industry is also divided among those segments. Another important 
characteristic is that there is low product differentiation, with companies competing mainly 
on price. Finally, exit barriers are high due to the great investments in facilities and 
infrastructure which demotivate firms to leave the market. Figure 8 shows a summary of the 
shipbuilding’s five forces. 
 
 
Figure 8. SIMA's five forces analysis. 
Adapted from Competitive strategy: Techniques for analyzing industries and competitors by  
M. E. Porter, 1980, New York: Free Press. 
 
1.4 External Analysis  
1.4.1 Political 
Due to the strategic nature of the shipbuilding industry, governments around the 
world may give assistance to this sector in a variety of ways, such as direct subsidies, tax 
incentives, cheap credits and restructuring assistance. In addition, governments should have 
considerable interest in ship repair and conversion activities because of their significant 
potential for direct and indirect employment of labor (Senturk, 2011). Moreover, countries 
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which have strong shipbuilding sectors may benefit in the coming years. The Spring 2015 
Industry Report noted: “nations enjoying increasing economic growth and in the midst of 
rising geopolitical tensions may be increasingly interested in procuring more advanced naval 
products from other countries” (Go Maritime, 2015). 
However, in the political sphere, there are three main concerns that SIMA faces. First, 
they depend on the government in turn and Ministry of Defense´s plans. During Ollanta 
Humala’ s government (2011-2016) SIMA sales were mainly absorbed by the Peruvian Navy 
and other public projects. Therefore, the company made little profits during this period. In 
addition, the Callao terminal port, managed by the company APM have manifested expansion 
projects that could jeopardize SIMA’s location. Finally, SIMA could suffer from 
government´s corruption or mixed interests (Barzola, Bomble, Esquen & Koening, 2013). 
1.4.2 Economic 
Shipbuilding is one of the oldest, most opened and fragmented markets in the world 
(Ahmed, 2016). This business is closely related to the shipping industry and for instance to 
the international trade and global economy. Therefore, ever since the financial crisis the 
shipbuilding and repair business have entered into a depression. Since then, shipyards have 
been suffering from low profit margins, depressed prices and a significant number of 
shipyards have gone out of businesses. The recovery is being slow and the industry is still 
facing a decrease in demand of new orders (The Shipbuilder's Association of Japan, 2016; 
Ahmed, 2016).  
Moreover, shipbuilding is highly dependent on the price of its main material, steel, 
which presents high volatility. Its highest latest peak was in 2012; however, in the last years 
its price has been falling from 4,000 CNY/Metric Ton in 2012 to 2,000 CNY/Metric Ton in 
2015 (Evans-Pritchard, 2015). Although SIMA has benefited from the falling prices during 
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the last four years, commodities prices are uncertain and tendencies could turn around in any 
moment.   
From a local perspective, Peru has achieved economic stability during the last years 
characterized by low levels of interest rates and inflation. Also, the international commerce of 
Peru have grown under different trade agreements. “In recent years, under presidents Alan 
Garcia (2006-2011) and Ollanta Humala (2011-2016), economic activity has benefited from a 
favorable international context, particularly from improving terms of trade” (“Peru Economic 
Outlook”, 2016). Peru recently count with several trade agreements with South American 
countries, the US, China, EU, Japan, Mexico etc.   
Furthermore, Peru stands out as an ideal strategic partner for China and Asia, both for 
its strong economy and its geographical location. In its role as a gateway from Latin America 
to China, Peru can strengthen its position as a logistics hub on the continent, thus taking 
advantage of investments in mining, energy and infrastructure. If Callao becomes a shipping 
hub, large vessels with a capacity of 15,000 containers would arrive creating more 
connections and more destinations for Peruvian exports (MINCETUR, as cited in Barzola 
et.al, 2013). 
During the last years the Peruvian government has privatized their ports, giving the 
concession to international companies. These ports are: (a) South Port Terminal of Callao, (b) 
Port of Matarani, (c) Paita Port Terminal, (d) Terminal boarding Mineral Concentrates in the 
Callao Port Terminal, (e) Multipurpose North Terminal (Callao Port Terminal) and (f) New 
Port Terminal of Yurimaguas. The purpose of this privatization program was to modernize 
the infrastructure an increase traffic of boats. This results in an opportunity for SIMA which 
has a larger demand of vessels that may require maintenance and / or repair when they reach 
the Peruvian territory (Barzola et.al, 2013). 
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1.4.3 Social 
The shipbuilding industry employees are known as shipwrights. These are highly 
skilled workers specialized in different types of ships or job positions (Ahmed, 2016). Peru 
has a good amount of talented engineers and qualified persons to accommodate a shipyard 
expansion.  However, there is also a great level of illiteracy in the workforce which must be 
taken carefully into consideration when handling such delicate projects. The company 
employs more than 1100 workers at the shipyard in Callao alone and most of these gain a 
valuable amount of skills and education (Novoa, personal communication, July 7, 2016). 
In addition, since the shipbuilding industry is labor intensive, labor costs are 
significant and could represent a competitive advantage or disadvantage depending on the 
countries’ wages. If comparing Peru to other countries of the region, this country has one of 
the lowest minimum wages ($258) in comparison to Chile ($373) and Panama ($529). This 
represents a great opportunity to SIMA, which could differentiate by offering lower prices 
(Federacion Interamericana de Asociaciones de Gestion Humana, 2016).  
1.4.4 Technological 
One challenge SIMA Callao will encounter in the close future is staying up to date 
with the new technologies used in the shipbuilding industry. Today, there are several 
international shows where new technologies are presented such as The International 
Workboat Show and the Maintenance World Expo. Some of the most important 
developments in the shipbuilding industry are green technologies oriented to reduce carbon 
footprints, which are explained in the environmental analysis (Ahmed, 2016).  
Also, rubber airbags, known also as MAX airbags, rubber inflatables or marine air 
bags are new technologies used to perform maintenance and repair services.  “With airbags, 
shipbuilders are able to build and repair in massive scales without having to turn down 
businesses and stay extremely competitive without having to build costly docks/rails to 
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increase their capacity” (Chan, 2015).  Lastly, advanced outfitting is a concept that involves 
assembling the outfit components like machinery, seating structures and piping into a small 
unit at the same time that the vessel hull is fabricated. With this technology, the building 
cycle time is reduced as well as the production costs (Chan, 2015). 
3D printing technology is starting to be used by the industry but few are affordable 
and sustainable. Recently, NSWC Carderock constructed a hospital ship using 3D printing. 
This technology could be used to build complex geometries of ship and quick replacement of 
ship’s part for repairing purpose. Also, shipbuilding robotics are being developed as a driver 
of efficiency and a method to prevent workers for doing dangerous tasks. It could also solve 
the shortage of skilled labor in many countries. As an example, the South Korean shipyard, 
Geoje, operates using robotic systems, which represent 68% of its production processes 
(Kumar, 2015). 
1.4.5 Environmental 
The industry, like many other sectors, is trending towards increasing demanding green 
goals. From an environmental point of view, the SIMA Callao’s location needs to take 
reasonable precautions for any potential tsunami or earthquake. Furthermore, as mentioned 
above, there are stricter environmental policies and norms today which need to be met and 
followed.  
BIMCO, the world's largest shipping association (more than 2,200 members 
globally), updates and distributes a document called The Guide to Maritime Environmental 
and Efficiency Management.  In these guidelines, the organization outlines a number of 
important topics ranging from efficiency, oil and air pollution, sewage, underwater noise, etc. 
(BIMCO, 2014). Some of the latest green technologies are: greener engines that minimizes 
nitrogen oxide, ultra-efficient optimized cooling systems, minimal friction hull paint to boost 
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fuel efficiency, ultra-efficient propeller designs, solar cell hybrid system and diversification 
of fuel mix (Chan, 2015).  
Finally, Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) engines are emerging as an environmental 
friendly alternative.  “In the LNG engines, CO2 emission is reduced by 20-25% as compared 
to diesel engines, NOX emissions are cut by almost 92%, while SOX and particulates 
emissions are almost completely eliminated” (Kumar, 2015). The industry is also trying to 
develop technologies to utilize renewable sources of energy such as wind and sun. However, 
the largest solar powered ship is just 100 metric ton and seems not viable to make a 100% 
solar commercial ship. However, there are many technologies today which support the big 
ships to reduce fuel consumption, Eco Marine Power is one of the most popular (Kumar, 
2015). 
1.4.6 Legal 
As mentioned before, SIMA is regulated by FONOFE. This institution sets 
regulations and controls of Peruvian state-owned enterprises and is responsible for approving 
the annual budget and investment proposals. Some relevant legislations that regulates SIMA 
operations are law No. 27073 and No. 28583.  In particular, the aforementioned Law No. 
27073 (1999), The Law of Industrial Services of the Marine, regulates the activities of the 
company within the scope of the defense ministry and establishes its main purpose that is to 
preferably serve the Navy of Peru. Private customers should be addressed only to self-finance 
the company. This regulation constitutes a great disadvantage of SIMA compared to their 
local and regional competitors, since the law limits the scope of decisions of this firm 
(Barzola, et.al, 2013). 
Another important regulation is the law No. 28583 of Reactivation of the National 
Merchant Marine (2005). It was created after the 90s, period in which the merchant navy 
broke and virtually disappeared due to the release of loads and increase of charges for ship´s 
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purchases. These measurements threat the shipbuilding and repairs industry since demand 
slow down during this period (Barzola, et.al, 2013). Other important laws are: No. 1138, Law 
of the Peruvian Navy; No. 1138, Law of the organization and functions of the Defense 
Ministry; No. 1031, Promotion of efficiency of state businesses and strategic planning and 
guidelines from The Defense Ministry, Peruvian Navy and FONAFE. Finally, it is important 
to note that although it is part of the Defense Minister and regulated by FONOFE, SIMA 
maintains a private administration and has an administrative, economic and financial 
autonomy. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the opportunities and threats found in the external 
analysis. 
Table 1 
Opportunities and Threats 
Opportunities Threats 
 Shipbuilding receives the support of 
many governments around the world 
as it is considered as a strategic 
industry. 
 International trade of Peru would 
likely grow under different trade 
agreements and due to its politic and 
economic stability. 
 Peru´s location stands out as an ideal 
partner for China and Asia, creating an 
opportunity on becoming the hub of 
South America. 
 The privatization of ports during the 
last years have increase the traffic of 
boats. 
 Peru has a good amount of talented 
and qualified engineers and one of the 
lowest labor costs of the region. 
 Development of new technologies are 
oriented to increase productivity and 
reduce environmental impact. 
 SIMA´s public demand depends on 
the government in turn  
 SIMA´s location could be threatened 
by an expansion of Callao´s terminal 
port. 
 The shipbuilding industry is closely 
related to the global economy. 
Therefore, since the financial crisis it 
has been suffering from low profit 
margins, depressed prices and low 
demand. 
 The industry is highly dependent on 
the price of steel which is presents 
high volatility. 
 The industry is having stricter 
demands to reduce its environmental 
impact. 
 SIMA´s main purpose is to serve the 
Peruvian Navy and private customers 





1.5 Internal Analysis  
1.5.1 Administration and marketing 
One of the biggest issues of SIMA is related with its ownership structure. As a state-
owned enterprise SIMA´s objectives are set by the government. Therefore, the firm´s priority 
is to serve the Peruvian navy and other projects of metalworking required by the government. 
By performing these projects SIMA makes no profits, limiting the firm´s growth and the 
possibility of generating a higher social impact. 
In the other hand, SIMA maintains a private administration and has an administrative, 
economic and financial autonomy. However, the direction is composed by Peruvian navy 
generals, who usually count with technical skills but lack from administrative and managerial 
capabilities. In addition, they usually serve the company for a short period that inhibits the 
continuity of plans and the implementation of a long-term strategic planning (Novoa, 
personal communication, July 7, 2016). 
Moreover, they are not allowed to promote their services.  In this area, the 
government limits their publicity. SIMA is only allowed to use direct marketing. For 
instance, they have to advertise in a specialized manner to a narrow audience since the 
government needs most of their time for their projections. They also lack from market 
intelligence, which means that they do not fully know their competition and positioning 
strategy. At the same time, SIMA doesn´t count with a segmentation and positioning strategy 
to differentiate from its rivals (De Izcue, personal communication, July 7, 2016). 
1.5.2 Operations 
In the Administrative aspect of the Callao shipyards, a key strength SIMA has is the 
ISOs certifications.  They meet the requirements and are up to date on these standards, and so 
a high level of credibility comes with the projects they carry out. Another important strength 
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is the privileged location that SIMA Callao´s shipyard occupies along the South American 
coast (De Izcue, personal communication, July 7, 2016). 
However, when talking about its infrastructure and capacity SIMA has the weakness 
of not being able to service every sort of ocean liner. In addition, their machinery and 
equipment are obsolete and outdated. There is also insufficient infrastructure of dry work of 
small and medium sized ships, limited parking space, inadequate equipment for submarine 
repairs and lack of infrastructure for the attention of large vessels (Novoa, 2012).  
This affects three other related areas: sales, operations and logistics.  Not having 
enough capacity and the proper industrial machines makes them loose sales and decreases 
levels of efficiency and productivity. Lastly, purchasing errors are also common generating 
production delays and bottlenecks since the work is performed manually and operators are 
not fully trained (Novoa, 2012).  
1.5.3 Finances 
Related to this weakness, SIMA is limited financially.  The net margins of the last 
years have been small even though the total revenues have been increasing (Servicios 
Industriales de la Marina,  2016).  As a result, the company does not have the funds to 
improve their infrastructure, increase capacity and invest in R&D. The government’s projects 
that SIMA takes on are not for profit. In addition, although the goal is to break even, the 
company ends up losing money because of setbacks and mistakes along the way (Novoa, 
personal communication, July 7, 2016). Chapter II and IV shows a complete analysis of profit 
margins and sales, which are disaggregated by business unit and by sector to explain 
differences and financial results.  
Moreover, SIMA lacks from policies in the procurement and financial division. The 
company lacks from a supplier´s payment policy which has forced the company to deal with 
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smaller suppliers. In addition, their international operations are not secured by financial 
instruments, having the risk of scams and bankruptcy of the counterpart.  
1.5.4 Human resources 
SIMA's human resources is a strong point in the industry because of the professionals 
they hire at a low cost. The navy counts with highly qualified engineers and specialists on 
shipbuilding tasks. Today, SIMA gives work to 1100 workers at their main shipyard (Novoa, 
personal communication, July 7, 2016). 
However, the organization is highly hierarchical and there is small communication. 
Employees are not encouraged to think creatively to find solutions and new opportunities 
because they are used to following orders.  In addition, SIMA lacks from a wage and 
promotion policy that results in low motivation of the workforce. Promotions are now based 
in experience and seniority which creates a feeling of injustice and demotivation specially of 
new workers. Lastly, the employees are over specialized in a single job, which inhibits them 
from rotating to other positions according to counteract demand (Novoa, 2012). 
1.5.5 Information systems and technology 
For communications and information systems, the company needs to replace or 
update their equipment to perform their work more effectively. A good portion of their 
technology is obsolete.  SIMA works with Microsoft Office packages but lacks from an ERP 
software to integrate all the firm´s information. Thence, it is extremely important for the firm 
to invest in an ERP system in order to integrate data, improve efficiency and take better 
informed decisions. SIMA also needs to create a R&D division focused on improving quality 
and generating competitive advantages (Novoa, personal communication, July 7, 2016).  
Table 2 presents a summary of SIMA´s strengths and weaknesses that have been 




Strengths and Weaknesses 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 SIMA maintains a private administration 
with economic and financial autonomy.  
 SIMA counts with international ISO 
certifications, which enhance its 
reputation. 
 Its privileged location in South America 
constitutes a competitive advantage over 
its rivals. 
 The firm counts with highly qualified 
engineers at a low cost. 
 SIMA´s objectives are set by the government. 
Attending public projects limits the firm´s 
growth and possibility of generating higher 
social impacts. 
 SIMA´s direction is composed by Peruvian 
naval generals who lack from administrative 
and managerial capabilities. 
 High turnover rates of naval officers inhibit 
long-term planning. 
 SIMA has marketing restrictions and could 
not promote its services on media. 
 They also lack from marketing intelligence 
and a segmentation and positioning strategy 
to differentiate from its rivals. 
 Its machinery and equipment are obsolete and 
infrastructure and capacity is insufficient to 
attend demand. 
 It also presents procurement and financial 
problems due to the lack of policies. 
 Net margins during the last years have been 
small even though total revenues have been 
increasing.  
 The organization is highly hierarchical and 
there is small communication. 
 The firm lacks from a wage and promotion 
policy based in results. 
 Employees are overspecialized in a single job 
which does not allow rotation. 
 The firm lacks from an integrated 
information system and  a R&D division. 
 
1.6 Conclusions  
The shipbuilding industry is slowly recovering from the world´s financial and facing 
low profits margins and depressed prices. The repairs unit however, has not been affected in 
the same level as ship-owners prefer to repair their vessels rather than buying new ones. In 
addition, increasingly aggressive competition in the world market like China, is threatening 
SIMA´s worldwide position. 
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Moreover, SIMA Callao's greatest strength is also its biggest weakness: the 
government's close ties to the company could either push the project forward or deter any 
future opportunity for the potential shipyard.  As explored above one of the key problems is 
the small profits SIMA generates, which inhibits them from growing and increasing their 
capacities. Other weaknesses of the company are related to the lack of policies the obsolete 
and insufficient infrastructure and the lack of a long-term planning. 
Ultimately, its high skilled and low cost workforce, its ISO certifications a its great 
location should be taken into consideration to formulate its positioning strategy and 
competitive advantages. Therefore, SIMA needs to move on and improve its facilities if they 
want to remain competitive on the market, not only with China but with other neighborhood 
countries like Panama and Chile, which have more capacity and higher technology levels. 
Expanding the maintenance and repairs capacity at SIMA Callao would open Lima up to a 



















Chapter II: Key Problem 
2.1 Description 
SIMA´s key problem has been formulated after recovering information from different 
sources: observations during a visit to SIMA´s facility at Callao, interviews with Carlos 
Novoa (Strategic Planning Manager) and the marketing team (lead by Carlos Alberto De 
Izcue), information handed by the firm and diverse external sources. After the investigation it 
has been determined that SIMA´s key problem is related to a financial weakness: the small 
profits obtained during the last years. Different problems located at different divisions and 
levels of the organization are related to the firm´s profitability. They are explained in Chapter 
V. 
Net margins have been bordering upon 2.3% during the last two years, despite of 
having increased revenues. In 2015, the company increased its sales to 318.9 M soles in 
comparison to the 250.9 M soles of 2014. However, the net margin remained essentially 
unchanged:  2.38% in 2015 and 2.35% in 2014  (Servicios Industriales de la Marina,  2016). 
Appendix A shows the Profit and Loss Statement of the year 2015.  
2.2 Timing and Magnitude 
In order to study the financial results, it has been compiled SIMA´s sales and net 
margins of the last 10 years which are shown in Table 3. It can be noticed that sales levels 
have increased year after year starting in 106M soles in 2005 and growing up to 328M soles 
in 2015. However, net margins do not show a clear tendency and have large variations in 1-
year periods. They also present a large dispersion, ranging from -12.24% in 2006 to 2.38% 
obtained last year.  
The average net margin of the last 10 years is 0.29%. However, the last two years, 
SIMA has obtained the highest profit margins of the 10-year period. Profit margins could 
have fluctuations since it depends on the proportion of public against private sales. They also 
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depend in the distribution of sales among business units which is explained in the next 
section. 
Table 3 
SIMA's Annual Sales and Net Margins 2005-2015 
 






 108’730,636 -12.24% 
2007
b
 150’741,312 2.06% 
2008
c
 184’358,965 0.48% 
2009
c
 198’894,319 1.70% 
2010
 d
 171’595,938 2.24% 
2011
 d
 220’843,686 1.95% 
2012
 e
 215’380,796 1.22% 
2013
 e
 213’322,867 0.84% 
2014
 f
 250’913,520 2.35% 
2015
f
 328’946,739 2.38% 
 
a
Servicios Industriales de la Marina (2006, pg.65), 
b
Servicios Industriales de la Marina (2008, pg.65), 
c
Servicios 
Industriales de la Marina (2010, pg.65), 
d
Servicios Industriales de la Marina (2012, pg.65), 
e
Servicios 
Industriales de la Marina (2014, pg.65), 
f
Servicios Industriales de la Marina (2016, pg.65). 
 
2.3 Location 
To find the location of the problems it is important to analyze the distribution of sales 
by sector and by business unit. First, the low profits can be attributed to the sales distribution 
by sector, as shown in Table 4. In the last four years, more than 70% of total sales have been 
performed to the public sector, which are orders that do not generate profits for the company. 
The other 30% of sales comes from the private sector. However, during the first six months 
of the current period, SIMA has reversed the distribution of sales, with only 15% of public 
sales and 84% destined to the private sector.  
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Table 4 
Distribution of SIMA´s Sales by Sector (2012-2016) 
 




2012 70% 30% 
2013 88% 12% 
2014 91% 9% 
2015 84% 16% 
2016 Jan-Jun 15% 84% 
Note. Data are from “Consultas Tesis” by C. Novoa, 2016.  
It is also important to analyze the distribution of sales by business unit since they 
present different profitability ratios. First, the shipbuilding unit is currently facing difficulties 
trying to generate profits. As mentioned above, the declining demand for ship projects after 
the financial crisis, along with the increasing competition from low-wage countries has 
caused an oversupply in the industry. As a consequence, shipbuilders have lowered its prices 
to attract buyers. The low prices and the increasing costs of steel are leaving producers with 
minimum profits and some shipyards are even incurring losses to maintain their operation 
going.  
Meanwhile, ship repair's margins have not been affected in the same scale. SIMA's 
net objective margins by business unit are shown in Table 5.  The margin's objectives have 
been set according to historic levels and profit goals of the company. Shipbuilding has the 






Minimum Net Margin Objective by Business Unit 
 
Business Unit Net Margin 
Objective 
Shipbuilding 5% 
Ship Maintenance and Repair 15% 
Metal Works 8% 
Note. This minimum margins were set in memorandum DES-2011-065 in April 2011.  
Data are from “Consultas Tesis” by C. Novoa, 2016.  
 
2.4 Ownership 
The problems stated above correspond to the finance division of SIMA. However, it is 
also related with other problems that exist in and around the organization, which are 
explained in Chapter V. One of the main problems could be attributed to the public 
ownership of the organization, which main objective is social rather than economic. It is 
focused on serving the Defense Ministry and the Peruvian Navy. 
In this way, the production capacity during the last years, which was directly 
influenced by Ollanta Humala's government, has been used to serve the public sector.  This 
left little time to carry out private orders. The government and other public institutions are 
caught up with the social role of SIMA, causing them to miss economic opportunities. 
Furthermore, the possibility of generating a higher profitability would also positively 







Chapter III: Literature Review 
3.1 Literature Mapping 
Today, most developed economies are based on opened markets and private 
organizations. However, in many countries, especially in emerging economies, state-owned 
enterprises still play an important role over GDP, employment and capitalization 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). Most of the studies that 
are reviewed in this section demonstrate that privatization improves firms´ financial and 
operating performance. Nevertheless, government´s ownership could be convenient in 
specific cases. 
The following section analyzes the literature related to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) as SIMA. Figure 9 presents a synopsis of the topics and literature that are covered in 
this chapter.  The themes discussed in this section are: definitions, rationale behind SOEs, 
trends, corporate governance, SOEs’ scorecard, SOEs’ failure, effects of ownership structure 
and privatization critics. The chapter begins by defining some concepts, followed by the 
rationale behind government enterprises and global trends and statistics related to public and 
private companies. Then, as corporate governance is a critical point on SOEs´ management, 
the challenges related to this topic are covered, followed by some guidelines of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which are 
internationally agreed standards for and efficient and transparent operation of SOEs. 
Moreover, since SOEs have multiple goals beyond financial ratios, new measurement 
models are presented. They all include additional KPIs such as social, human, innovation, 
citizen and welfare, and environmental indicators. In addition, there are explained some of 
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3.2 Literature Review  
3.2.1 Definitions 
The definition of state-owned enterprises differs across countries. The Guidelines of 
Corporate Governance of SOE´s define them as “any corporate entity recognized by national 
law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership” (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2015). They are also known as government´s corporations, 
government’s business enterprises, state linked companies, parastatals, public enterprises and 
so on (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). It includes joint stock companies, limited liability 
companies and partnerships limited by shares, which means that the state can share the 
ownership with a private entity (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2015).  
In the other hand, a private company is a firm whose ownership is private and 
privatized firms refer to previously state-controlled companies where private owners 
presently have control and the level of state ownership is reduced (Beslerova & Varcholova, 
2013). Privatization however, includes a great range of activities such as the sale of public 
assets to private owners, the simple cessation of government programs, contracting out to 
private firms’ services formerly provided by state organizations, and the entry of private 
producers into markets that were formerly public monopolies (Goodman & Loveman, 1991). 
3.2.2 Rationale behind SOEs 
During the mid 1950´s SOE´s became popular in many nations due to the economy 
situation and nature of many industries (Chong & Lopez, 2003). The rationale of government 
enterprises corresponds to a mix of social, economic and strategic interests. The ultimate 
purpose of SOE´S is to maximize the value for society, through and efficient allocation of 
resources (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). Some of the rationales include:  
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 Provide public and merit goods such as national defense, public parks, health and 
education, which benefit the entire society (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). 
 Job creation and improvement of labor relations in “strategic” sectors 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015).   
 Increase access to public services. In some circumstances the private sector refuses 
to serve less desirable customers.  In this situations the state intervention is justified 
by creating a public company and providing subsides to reduce the prices of basic 
services and goods (Forfas, 2010). 
 Control of abuse in natural monopolies. Some industries are natural monopolies 
since entry barriers are extremely high (railways, water and electricity). In such 
circumstances, suppliers can abuse from their position by charging high prices. In 
this situations governments could opt for SOEs in order to eliminate the abuse and 
charge rational prices (Forfas, 2010). 
 Eliminate capital market failures. When the private sector is unable or unwilling to 
finance projects with high returns in the long-term but high risks in the short-term, 
the state funds this projects by creating joint ventures. However, the presence of 
more advanced capital markets is reducing the need for public funding (Forfas, 
2010). 
It is of extremely importance to review the rationale behind the SOEs and consider 
whether a more efficient allocation of resources to benefit the society could be achieved 
through an alternative ownership or taxation structure (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2015). Some countries have established procedures to review 
these issues periodically, the German budget law is a clear example. It requires the 
government to review the arguments for state ownership every two years. If the arguments 
are rejected in the budget bill, then the SOE is automatically privatized (Forfas, 2010). The 
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following value creation/profitability matrix provides a framework for state´s decisions over 
SOE´s ownership (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). In the quadrants with societal value 
deterioration the state should opt whether to close or sale the company or re-formulate the 
SOE mission with a societal value adding activity. 
 
Figure 10. Value creation/profitability matrix. 




China has a particular history of SOEs. After the long period of war that precedes the 
establishment of The People´s Republic of China in 1949, SOEs were created to rebuild the 
country. They provided not only employment, but also social services, education and 
healthcare. However, ever since the economic reform and opening up policies from 1978, 
China has overcome a privatization transformation. The number of SOEs fell from 196 in 
2003 to 115 in 2013 (Gang & Hope, 2013). 
Nevertheless, China´s main SOEs in strategic industries continue playing an 
important role in the internal and international market. Many global partners have 
complained about the unfair competition originated by policies favoring SOEs. Some of them 
are justified such as the argument that SOEs enjoy preferential treatment in licensing and 
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obtaining government´s public contracts. However, they do not have preferential financing 
and they compete aggressively in competitive markets. “In May 2012, China committed to 
developing a market environment of fair competition and treating all enterprises without 
discrimination” (Gang & Hope, 2013) 
3.2.3 SOEs’ Trends 
Although SOEs gained great popularity during the 1950´s the public ownership of 
commercial enterprises has declined since the end of the 20th
 
century (Forfas, 2010). The 
entire world has embraced privatization after the poor performance, inefficiency and failure 
of state-owned enterprises (Chong & Lopez, 2003). Figure 11 shows the decline of public 
ownership in many OECD countries from 1998 to 2008. It can be noted that in 17 out of 27 
countries the state ownership has been reducing its participation, five countries have 
maintained it and only six countries have increased it. 
Figure 11. Scope of public ownership index 2008 (Scale 0-6).  
Data are from “The Role of State Owned Enterprises: Providing infrastructure and 





Despite the downward trend of SOEs around the world, state ownership has been 
rising in influence over the past decade. This can be noted in the proportion of SOEs among 
the Fortune Globe 500, which has grown from 9% in 2005 to 23% in 2014. It has mainly 
been driven by the increasing presence of Chinese SOEs in the top rankings.  
In fact, there are three Chinese companies that have reached the top ten since 2010: 
Sinopec Group, China National Petroleum and State Grid (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). 
Figure 12 shows the participation of Chinese and the rest of the world´s SOEs in the Fortune 
500 companies. It can be noted a growing trend of SOEs in terms of quantity and total 
revenues. 
 
Figure 12. SOEs in the Fortune Global 500, % and Revenues.  
Data are from “The Role of State Owned Enterprises: Providing infrastructure and 




SOEs are usually concentrated in public services and strategic industries such as 
petroleum refining, utilities and financial services. On the contrary, few countries have 
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government presence in competitive industrial sectors such as manufacturing, construction 
and retail. However, it is interesting to observe some SOEs´ emerging sectors such as motor 
vehicles and parts, telecommunications, mail, aerospace and defense. Figure 13 shows the 
distribution of SOE´s across economy sectors in Fortune Global 500 companies. The sectors 
that have increased its presence during the last ten years are mining, energy, engineering and 
insurance. 
Another important trend of SOEs is that they have become global companies. The 
increased international competition for finance, talent and resources have positioned SOEs as 
tools to compete in the global economy. For instance, those countries with the highest SOEs’ 
shares (China, United Arab Emirates, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, India and 
Brazil) have become important traders, representing together more than 20% of the global 
trade (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). 
 
Figure 13. Distribution of SOE across economy sectors in Fortune Global 500. 





3.2.4 Corporate governance 
SOEs´ challenges. Some common challenges faced by SOE are related with 
governance. State interference is one of the most recurrent problems, together with unclear 
lines of responsibility and lack of accountability. On the contrary, some cases are related with 
distant ownership by the state that leads SOE managers to self-serving behaviors instead of 
serving the best interest of the society (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2015).  Additionally, some other issues found at SOE´s governance are 
corruption, bribery and inefficiency (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). 
Another important challenge is to fulfill its multiple and conflictive goals: the 
financial objectives and the public policy role (Forfas, 2010). The differences between the 
public and private sector lie in the motivations and objectives of these organizations. While 
the private sector uses their business activities to achieve financial objectives, the public 
sector uses finances as a mean to achieve social objectives. In other words, SOEs need to 
remain financially sustainable and commercially competitive to create value for the society 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015).  
Guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs. In order to maximize value creation 
SOEs should follow some guidelines and principles. The OECD Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance of SOEs are internationally agreed standards for governments to ensure that 
SOEs operate efficiently, transparently and in an accountable manner (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). The term corporate governance has been 
defined as “organization and rules that affect expectations about the exercise of control of 
resources in firms” (World Bank Development Report as cited in Beslerova & Varcholova, 
2013). In public companies conflict of interest and difficulties arise, being necessary to 
follow guidelines and systems to handle these problems. 
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The first principle is to establish a clear purpose and mission, linked with the desired 
social and economic objectives. It should be communicated to the whole organization. 
Second, key positions such as the board of directors and top managers should comply with 
the “4C´s” which stands for: clarity, capacity, capability and commitment to integrity”. Third, 
transparency and accountability are required, through the publication of financial and other 
performance indicators. Fourth, it is important to co-create value with other stakeholders in 
society (universities, public sector, NGO´s, citizens) who could provide guidance and inputs 
on the direction of the SOE (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015).  
It is also important to clarify the state´s role over  SOEs´ operations. The government 
should participate actively, ensuring transparency and accountability on the governance of 
the SOE. In this line, the state should simplify and standardize the SOEs’ corporate norms. 
However, the state should guarantee the full operational autonomy of public organizations 
avoiding interventions in the SOEs’ management. The board of direction should be the 
responsible of the SOEs´ operations. This does not mean that the government should not have 
decision power, but that its authority should be limited to strategic issues and public policy 
objectives (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015). 
Additionally, the ownership of SOEs should be centralized in a single entity that 
supervises the whole range of public companies. It should be clearly identified to a specific 
ministry or a separate administrative entity. Finally, it is important to clarify the codes of 
ethic for state officials serving as SOE board members (Organization for Economic Co-




3.2.5 SOEs´ performance 
Measuring an organization´s performance is necessary and vital. The purpose is not 
only to know how a firm is performing but also determine how to improve indicators (Asian 
Development Bank, 2007). Performance-monitoring systems refers to institutions, processes 
and documents that are used by governments to control the financial and non-financial 
performance of SOEs. This system involves three key elements: (a) setting strategies and 
objectives, (b) structuring performance agreements between SOEs and governments and (c) 
developing key performance indicators and targets (The World Bank, 2014). 
Traditional systems measure performance using financial indicators such as revenue 
growth and profitability (Asian Development Bank, 2007). However, it is important to note 
that since SOEs have multiple objectives, its performance should be measured with additional 
KPIs beyond financial. The total impact measurement management (TIMM) framework 
developed by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2015), is a useful tool that could be used to identify 
the value creation of the social, environmental, social and economic activities of a company. 
This framework is presented in Figure 14. 
The balance scorecard (BSC) is the most widely adopted system today (Asian 
Development Bank, 2007). Unlike traditional performance systems, the BSC includes 
different KPIs such as social, human, innovation, citizen and welfare, and environmental 
capitals (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2015). Governments could either design a BSC for the 
country´s entire SOE sector or stimulate each SOE to design specific BSCs (Asian 





Figure 14.  The total impact measurement management framework.  





Figure 15. Scorecard dimensions.  




3.2.6 SOEs´ failure 
The literature talks about two principal reasons of state ownership failure. First, the 
incorrect monitoring and poor incentives for SOEs’ managers that is related with the lack of 
control of financial entities and stock holders since the state is the owner and lender of SOEs. 
Additionally, the board of directors take most decisions based on political rather than market 
forces (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). The second issue is related to the political interference 
over the firm´s production, which results in excessive employment, inefficient investment 
and poor quality (Shleifer & Vishny, 1996). 
Bozec, Breton and Cote (2002, pp. 383-405) summarized three theories that support 
privatization of public companies: (a) property rights theory (by Alchian & Demsetz, 1973), 
(b) public choice (by Niskanen, 1971; Tullok, 1976) and (c) agency theory (by Jensen & 
Meckling ,1976).  The first theory argues that under state ownership, property rights are 
poorly determined and there is no bankruptcy threat. As SOEs’ managers are not constraint 
by these type of controls, they are less inclined to maximize profits.  
The public choice theorists talked about the problems in government administration 
arguing that “managers of the state-owned firms are more concerned to maximize their own 
power, their prestige and the amount of resources under their control, while the politicians, 
members of the government care more about re-election than for monitoring the managers of 
the public firm”. Finally, the agency theory states that managers have a conflict of interest 
since they look for maximizing their own advantage, different from a business owner or a 
private firm manager who is disciplined by outside and inside control systems. 
3.2.7 Ownership structure 
Different authors have studied how differences in ownership structure could affect the 
financial and operating performance of the firm. In other words, they compare the 
performance of SOEs against privatized firms. There is a generalized belief that private 
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enterprises perform better than public companies since these last ones are perceived as being 
mismanaged and squandering assets and resources (Bozec et.al, 2002, pp. 383-405). 
Most of the studies presented suggest that privatization of state-owned enterprises 
leads to better performance. Despite the cases of privatization failures, the total record shows 
that privatization programs lead to increased profitability and productivity, quality 
improvements and fiscal growth. In the contrary, privatization failures are related to 
inadequate re-regulation, poor contract design, corruption and high costs of capital (Chong & 
Lopez, 2003).  
Chung and Kim (2007) concluded that the efficiency of private companies is 
considerably better than that of state-owned enterprises and partially better than privatized 
enterprises. Ehrlich, Gallais-Hamonno, Liu and Lutter (1994) found productivity differences 
between SOEs and privatizes companies.  Their study proved that privatization can increase 
productivity up to 2% a year and reduce costs by 1.9%. They also found that productivity was 
not affected by the degree of market competition or state regulation. 
Another study performed by Megginson, Nash and Randenbourgh (1994), 
demonstrated that privatization leads to increases in profitability, efficiency, output, 
employment and payment of dividends. Similarly, Omran (2002) found a significant increase 
of profitability, efficiency, capital expenditures and dividends that newly privatized firms. 
However, this last study in contrast to Megginson’s et.al (1994), found a decline in 
employment, debt and risk with privatization. 
Some other studies are focused in the effect of ownership structure in transition 
economies. With the liberation of the economies the share of the private sector in the GDP 
increased from 60% to 90% (Beslerova & Varcholova, 2013). Ongore and Vincent (2011) 
performed and investigation in Kenya. Results showed that ownership concentration and 
government ownership have a significant negative relationship performance. On the other 
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hand, foreign, private and diffuse ownership had a positive relationship. Nevertheless, a study 
of Latin American firms performed by López-Morales & Vargas-Hernández (2014) 
suggested that the type of ownership is not relevant to the financial performance in this 
context. 
However, Bozec et.al (2002, pp. 383-405) argued that these studies are distorted since 
private and public firms do not have the same goals. They indicated that SOEs have specific 
mandates, some of them incompatible with economic results and identified in the literature as 
non-commercial goals. They encompass political and social dimensions which sometimes 
bring extra costs or a reduction of revenues of the firms. The studies that have been 
mentioned ignore in their calculations the social advantages of SOEs.  
Nevertheless, Bozec et.al (2002) realized a study in Canadian companies which 
included non-commercial goals. Their results suggested that SOEs may have a negative effect 
on performance when it has specific goals other than profit maximization. Additionally, they 
discovered that public managers can manage as well as private managers, when they have the 
same goals. Finally, their results contradicted the property theory, establishing that is not a 
question of ownership but instead of goals what affects the firm´s performance. In this line, 
the profitability of public companies could be improved without privatization if the goals of 
the firm are reduced to financial performance.  
Another study on the performance of state-owned enterprises by Chung and Kim 
(2007) illustrates the effects of privatizing pressures over SOEs´ efficiency. They performed 
a comparison between 22 Korean SOEs between different periods, one under privatization 
pressure (1998-2002) and the other period without a government pressure. They found a 
significant relationship between the privatization pressure and the operating efficiency of 
SOEs. For instance, during the period 1998-2002 where the government imposed tighter 
fiscal control on SOEs while implementing a privatization program, efficiency increased in 
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these organizations. However, the degree of improvement by pressure was smaller than that 
of already privatized companies. 
3.2.8 Privatization critics 
There are several theories against privatization. Critics are based in the belief that 
gains in privatized firm´s profitability are achieved at the expense of the society. Goodman 
and Loveman (1991) argue that private ownership does not necessarily translate into 
improved efficiency. He added that private sector managers may have no remorse on making 
essential services unaffordable or unavailable if they lead to higher profits. Therefore, 
privatization would just be effective if private managers have the incentives to act in the 
public interest. 
 Chong and Lopez (2003) argued that profitability gains are obtained from the losses 
of other actors: (a) from the society through the use of market power, (b) from workers by 
means of lower salaries, and (c) from the government. However, empirical evidence 
presented by the same study contradicts such arguments. First, the abuse of market power has 
been rejected by data from Latin America, which shows that changes in profitability are 
generally larger in competitive rather than non-competitive sectors. In Mexico, operating 
margins from privatized firms in competitive sectors increased in 14.5% and only 8.5% for 
non-competitive industries. Similarly, non-competitive sectors in Peru increased their 
profitability in an average of 27% while the mean of the whole sample was 32%. 
 
Another important argument is that when privatizing firms, governments loose the 
firm´s profitability and put it in hands of private firms. Nevertheless, there is also empirical 
evidence that shows that SOEs are less efficient than private firms and that privatization leads 
to profitability increases (Shleifer & Vishny, as stated in Chong & Lopez, 2003).  Moreover, 
tax collection from SOEs actually increased after privatization in most Latin American 
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countries (Chong & Lopez, 2003). 
However, worker exploitation critics have not been disregarded. First, it is important 
to note that labor cost reductions are caused by fewer workers or lower wages. Some studies 
shown in Chong and Lopez (2003) confirm that employment costs fell between 20% to 30% 
after privatizations in Latin America, which are mainly related to layoffs. However, the same 
study demonstrates that industry wages usually increase after privatizations, by about 100% 
in Mexico and Peru.  
Furthermore, some economists agree that it is the quality of the state rather than the 
fact that assets are owned by the state that matters. In developing countries, characterized by 
market and information failures, the state should play and important role in promoting long-
term development. Therefore, in many developing countries, privatization has resulted in 
weakening the government without a strengthened private sector. Moreover, privatization has 
negatively affected labor markets and consumers, expressed in higher prices and on the 
exclusion of large segments of the population (“Critics of Privatization”, n.d.). 
3.3 Conclusions 
Although SOEs gained great popularity during 1950´s the public ownership of 
commercial enterprises has declined since the end of the 20th century. Most economies have 
embraced privatization after the poor performance, inefficiency and failure of state-owned 
enterprises. However, SOEs have been rising in influence, increasing its participation among 
the Fortune Globe 500.  
Despite SOEs’ criticism, government´s ownership could be convenient in specific 
cases: to provide public and merit goods, to eliminate monopolies and market failures and to 
create jobs and have a direct management over strategic industries. In addition, governments 
should review continuously, the rationale behind SOEs and consider whether a more efficient 
allocation of resources to benefit the society could be achieved through an alternative 
 48 
ownership. Also, sine SOEs have multiple objectives its performance should be measured 
within a new scorecard with additional KPIs beyond financial ratios such as social, human, 
innovation, citizen and welfare, and environmental capitals. 
Good governance is also critical to ensure their positive performance and expected 
contribution to their economies. The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of SOEs 
are internationally agreed standards that could lead governments to an efficient and 
transparent administration of SOEs. Some of the principles are: to establish a clear purpose 
and mission, to ensure transparency and accountability and to clarify the role of the state over 
the SOEs’ operations. The state should guarantee the full operational autonomy of public 
organizations avoiding interventions in the SOEs’ management. 
Finally, different authors have studied how differences in ownership structure can 
affect the financial and operating performance of the firm. Overall, the total record shows 
that privatization programs lead to increases profitability and productivity, quality 
improvements and fiscal growth. However, studies are distorted since private and public 
firms do not have the same goals. Bozec et.al study concluded that public managers can 
manage as well as private managers when they have the same goals and that it is not the 
difference in ownership but the difference in goals what affects the firm´s performance. 
The literature review has provided valuable insights related to SIMA´s financial 
problem. First, it has been mentioned the extremely importance of reviewing the rationale 
behind SOEs. It was stated that products and services related to national defense are 
considered strategic industries. Also, since shipbuilding is labor intensive it provides 
numerous job positions.  Therefore, SIMA´s state ownership responds to social and strategic 
interests. From this, it can be argued that SIMA should remain as a public company to have a 
better control of a strategic industry and maintain its social role. 
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Second, it was discussed that SOEs have both financial objectives and a public role. 
Therefore, it needs to remain financially sustainable and commercially competitive to create 
value for the society. This idea suggests that a significant part of SIMA´s capacity should be 
advocated to the private sector in order to generate profits. This is the only way that the firm 



































Chapter IV: Qualitative/Quantitative Analysis 
4.1 Qualitative Analysis 
As shown in Chapter II, SIMA has been generating small profits during the last ten 
years. Even though net margins have recently improved (see Appendix A), they are too small 
to perform the long-term investments that are required. SIMA´s actual capacity does not 
allow them to attend private clients since it is all taken by government´s projects. It was also 
mentioned in Chapter III that the firm needs to remain financially sustainable to continue 
with its operations and that the only way of creating profits is by serving private orders. 
Therefore, SIMA needs to increase its capacity to be able to serve the private sector. 
Likewise, it has been mentioned in the internal analysis that the firm´s infrastructure 
and equipment are obsolete and outdated. Therefore, SIMA needs to invest in new 
technologies and infrastructure if they intend to remain commercially competitive. Their 
local competition in Chile and Panama are generating competitive advantages by having the 
latest technologies. This would not only increase its competitiveness but also its productivity. 
There are other minor problems located around the company that could be affecting 
its financial indicators. It was mentioned that the company lacks from human resources, 
procurement and financial policies. The first one is affecting motivation levels and 
productivity, the second causes delays and bottlenecks on production and the last one 
increases the firm´s financial risk and supplier´s prices. As it is known, productivity, and 
bottlenecks have a direct relationship with financial losses.  
4.2 Quantitative Analysis 
In order to determine if SIMA's profit margins are attractive or unattractive, the 
company profitability ratios have been compared with its competitors: ASMAR (public 
company) and ACENAV (private) both from Chile, China Huarong Energy Company 
Limited (private), China Shipbuilding Industry Co. (public) and CSSC (public) from China. 
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Additionally, the information is also compared with the profitability of the Chinese 
Shipbuilding Industry in the last five years. The indicators that are compared in Table 6 are: 
Gross Margin, Operating Margin, Net Margin and ROE.  
In the years 2014 and 2015, SIMA obtained a small gross margin, because the 
majority of sales were made to government entities. Detroit Chile presents that highest 
margins since it is a private company, which gives an idea of the gross margin that SIMA 
could obtain if they increase private sales. On the other hand, it can be noted that even China 
Huarong Energy Company Limited, which is also private, obtained a small gross margin due 
to price reductions. 
  The Chinese industry was significantly affected following the financial crisis. Today 
only 100 out of the 300 Chinese yards have day-to-day operations in comparison to the 3,000 
yards in 2010 (“The Good and Bad Outlook”, 2016). China Huarong Energy Company 
Limited has barely been operating due to shortage of funds and the lack of availability of 
banking facilities required for accepting new orders. Finally, the group was still carrying high 
operating expenses and finance costs (China Huarong Energy Company Limited, 2015). On 
the other hand, CSSC have responded to the declining orders by consolidating its yards and 
reducing costs (“The Good and Bad Outlook”, 2016). 
When analyzing operating margins, it is noted that SIMA obtains negative results in 
comparison to the positive results of its competitors (with the exception of China Huarong). 
This suggests that SIMA is not including administrative and sales costs in the price of public 
projects. Additionally, SIMA obtains positive and similar net margins than those of ASMAR, 
but lower than Detroit. Chinese companies obtained negative gross margins in the last two 
years but it is still positive in the evaluation of the last five years. SIMA’s positive net 
margins are related to financial incomes. Finally, SIMA obtained higher ROE than ASMAR 
but lower than Detroit. It is important to note that this last company is involved in 
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shipbuilding, maintenance and repair which represents 65% of its sales; the other 35% 
corresponds to motor sales.  
Table 6 













































2.73% 7.05% 20.01% 16.26% 50.24% 8.19% 5.18% 6.63% 20.13% 
Operating 
Margin 
-5.65% -2.41% 4.58% 0.97% 19.51% -159% -7.16% 4.93% 2.71% 
Net 
Margin 
2.38% 2.35% 1.75% 3.89% 9.15% -213% -4.38% -0.42% 0.64% 
ROE 5.52% 4.55% 0.72% 1.83% 7.7% -81% -4.47% -0.24% 4.55% 
a
 Servicios Industriales de la Marina (2016, p.65), 
b
 Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada (2016, p.56), 
c 
Detroit Chile (2015), 
d
China Huarong Energy Company Limited (2015, p. 53), 
e
 Market Watch, 2016 
(http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/601989/profile) 
f 
Fusion Media Limited, 2016 
(http://www.investing.com/equities/cssc-steel-ratios). 
 
It has been shown that in comparison to other public companies of the industry, SIMA 
presents similar or superior profits.  However, Detroit Chile has shown the potential profits 
that SIMA could obtain if it increases its capacity to serve private clients. Also, SIMA should 
avoid negative operating margins by including operating costs in the budget of public 
projects.  
Additionally, it has been shown in Table 6 that the most profitable business unit is 
repair and maintenance with net margins of 15% in comparison to the 5% of shipbuilding and 
8% of metal works.   Table 7 presents the distribution of SIMA’s sales by business unit. It 
should be noted that in the last years, SIMA’s shipbuilding sales have fallen while its 
maintenance and repair sales have risen. In the period 2011-2013, SIMA’s sales were focused 
in shipbuilding. However, 2014 and 2015 the repair and maintenance division have been the 
focus of work. 
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Table 7 
Sales Distribution by Business Unit 2011-2015 (expressed in soles) 
Business Unit 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Shipbuilding 39% 47% 61% 18% 1% 
Repair & Maintenance 33% 36% 22% 51% 77% 
Weapons and Electronics 1% 2% 3% 18% 16% 
Metal Works 27% 15% 14% 2% 4% 
Others 0% 0% 0% 11% 3% 




Chapter V: Root-Cause Analysis of the Problem 
5.1 Identified Causes 
In order to analyze the roots of the problem, a fish-bone analysis has been performed. 
Roots has been detected in different areas of the company: management, workers, working 
conditions, materials, machines and technology and marketing. The fish-bone analysis is 
shown in Figure 16.  
 
                      
Figure 16.  Fish-bone analysis of SIMA's small profits. 
 
5.1.1 Management 
Government-regulated. As stated before, SIMA is a public company with private 
administration. It has administrative, technical, economic and financial autonomy, managed 
by the board of directors. However, it is regulated by the Defense Ministry and the National 
Financing Funds of Public Companies (FONAFE). The first one is their most important client 
(stakeholder) and the second one a stockholder  (Servicios Industriales de la Marina,  2008a). 
As SIMA's main objective is to serve the Peruvian Navy and due to the small 
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work for the Peruvian Navy. Therefore, it is difficult for SIMA to create long-term 
relationships with private clients and this situation has created a negative reputation for the 
firm (Novoa, personal communication,  July 21, 2016).  
High turnover of officers. It has been mentioned before that the career progression of 
marine officers does not allow them to stay in SIMA for more than two years, except for the 
General Command Specialist officers and other justified cases  (Servicios Industriales de la 
Marina, 2008a). This inhibits, many times, the continuity of stable management, the 
development and implementation of strategic planning and the establishment of long-term 
goals. Big projects such as the development of the current shipyard or the creation of a 
PANAMAX yard are not in their plans since they are only focused in short-term objectives. 
Additionally, high turnover implies higher costs of hiring and training, and affects 
productivity and authority levels  (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2008a). 
Lack of managerial skills and vision. SIMA is directed by marine officers of 
different specialties. Sometimes the skills of the officers meet the required capabilities. 
However, there are many occasions where there is a lack of managerial and technical skills 
(Novoa, personal communication, July 21, 2016).   
The blindness of their social role. SIMA’s main objective is to serve the national 
government and the Peruvian navy by building ships and other metal infrastructure and 
giving maintenance and repair services. However, SIMA’s private administration allows 
them to serve private clients. It has been explained that public projects do not generate profits 
and among the private businesses, ship maintenance and ship repair are the most profitable. 
However, private orders are just carried out when their public contracts are not in demand. 
This prevents SIMA from working with private clients and as explained before, this affects 
the reputation of the company for rejecting orders. 
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It is believed that SIMA’s economic role is not opposite but complementary to its 
social role. If SIMA increases its capacity in order to serve private clients, the company will 
be able to generate profits and reinvest them in R&D and technology, increasing SIMA’s 
competitiveness. Additionally, the increasing demand will generate more jobs, and further 
contribute to their goal of positive social impact.  
5.1.2 Workers 
Over specialization of labor. One of SIMA’s labor problems is that employees are 
over specialized in one function. In several occasions the firm had tried to assign employees 
to different functions according to the demand with negative results. SIMA needs to hire 
multifunctional workers or train their labor force in different activities to achieve a higher 
flexibility and productivity (Novoa, personal communication, July 21, 2016).   
Inflexible labor contracts. One of the social objectives of SIMA is to generate job 
positions. Since shipbuilding, maintenance, repair and metal works are labour intensive 
activities, SIMA employs more than 2,500 workers between their three locations. In the past 
the company had employed larger labor forces of more than 5,000 workers. However, due to 
its social role, the firm avoids firing workers even during slow business periods (Novoa, 
personal communication, July 21, 2016).   
Inadequate wage and promotion policies. SIMA does not has an adequate wage and 
promotion policies that recognizes efficacy and efficiency. The lack of formal indicators and 
the fact that bonuses are given to some employees without a common understanding, creates 
a feeling of injustice among the workers. Promotions and bonuses are given based on 
employees' loyalty, experience and seniority. They do not consider other indicators such as 
productivity and competencies to measure their performance. In addition, the low wages have 
generated an outflow of talent to competitors' firms (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 
2008a). 
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Military commands. Since the firm is directed by marine officers, the company works 
by military commands. Workers are used to receiving and following orders. They are not 
encouraged to think creatively to find solutions and new opportunities  (Servicios Industriales 
de la Marina, 2008a). 
Inadequate working conditions. The deteriorating conditions in which services are 
provided could affect the motivation of workers, and this could, for example, affect the final 
service given to the client in their work (Novoa, 2012). 
5.1.4 Materials 
Lack of a supplier's payment policy. SIMA does not counts on a supplier’s payment 
policy, which means that they are not guaranteed payments for their contracts. This has 
forced the company to deal with smaller suppliers who are usually more expensive.  
Additionally, because of this payment policy, SIMA often faces several problems with 
suppliers such as: delays, delivery failures, quality issues and quotation errors. Additionally, 
international purchases are performed by bank transfers without letters of credits or any other 
financial instrument to protect and guarantee the contract. In this way, SIMA takes the risk of 
losing the money if suppliers go out of business (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2008a). 
Purchasing process errors. The purchasing department does not always program the 
orders in advance, and this generates production delays and bottlenecks. Also, the purchasing 
documents usually contain errors, causing delays and re-processing of orders (Servicios 
Industriales de la Marina, 2008a). It is necessary to train this division and implement 
indicators to measure the performance.  
Floating price of materials. Shipbuilding is highly dependent on the price of its main 
material: steel. Other important materials include copper, aluminium, zinc and nickel. Steel 
plates are imported from China, the world's leader of the steel market, representing more than 
46% of the total production (Gilberg, 2012). Before 2012 steel prices had been increasing; 
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however, in the last years its price has been falling from 4,000 CNY/Metric Ton in 2012 to 
2,000 CNY/Metric Ton in 2015 (Evans-Pritchard, 2015). Even though SIMA has benefited 
from the falling prices, the last years' fluctuation can turn again and the material prices can 
rise in the future. 
5.1.5 Machines and Infrastructure 
Insufficient and obsolete infrastructure  
Insufficient infrastructure for dry work of small and medium sized ships. There is a 
tendency of the national fishing fleet to use more and larger vessels. However, the existing 
capacity is limiting SIMA to serve the business demand, especially during fishing off 
seasons, when ships take advantage of the free time to carry out their maintenance services 
(Novoa, 2012). The existing infrastructure has a limited capacity. It consists in one dry dock 
and three floating docks that can serve up to seven small ships at the time (Novoa, 2012).   
However, SIMA is already building a new shipyard, and the first phase will be 
inaugurated in February 2017. This new shipyard will be able to serve four more ships and 
one submarine at a time. The rest of the project is expected to be completed in two years, 
increasing the capacity to working on 17 ships simultaneously. This new yard will also use an 
elevator that will allow to access the 17 ships (Novoa, personal communication, July 21, 
2016). 
Limited parking space. This issue is contemplated in the new shipyard, which counts 
with enough parking to work 17 ships at the same time (Novoa, personal communication, 
July 21, 2016).   
Obsolete equipment for shipbuilding and repairs. The current equipment used for 
electricity, compressed air, gases, water do not allow the installation of new equipment to 
increase its capacity (Novoa, 2012).  Also, SIMA counts with an adequate software for the 
design of small boats. However, the software used for the design of large vessels and naval 
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engineering is obsolete, limiting the competitiveness of SIMA in the shipbuilding business 
(Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2008a). 
Additionally, the largest shipyards in the world have automated processes. Their 
production lines employ modular construction systems in dry docks equipped with overhead 
cranes of large capacity, intelligent systems and robotics. This saves time, costs and improves 
productivity (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2008a). 
Inadequate infrastructure and equipment for submarine repair. The current division 
does not have adequate equipment to perform submarine repairs such as bridge cranes, 
cutting equipment, high-performance compressors and specialized equipment. Additionally, 
the current infrastructure cannot service adequately the Angamos 209 submarine type, which 
constitutes the first line of defense of the country. This submarines have been in use for more 
than 30 years, and are in urgent need of repair. Finally, the submarines repairs have not 
turned a profit for the company in the last 12 months in comparison to the ship maintenance 
(Novoa, 2012). 
Lack of infrastructure for the attention of large vessels. Nowadays, the ships crossing 
the Panama channel have grown in length to the extent that the Panamax ships cannot enter 
the SIMA dry dock (Novoa, 2012). So they are currently evaluating the possibility of 
building a Panamax dock, which would represent a high investment. However, it would open 
up the shipping hub in Callao to potentially becoming a much more competitive service 
location (Novoa, personal communication, July 21, 2016).   
Inadequate use of infrastructure. Dry docks are used to repair ships of low and 
medium board. They do not have the ability to conduct and develop business with large sized 
vessels. Although this dock can receive ships of smaller size, when this is done, the income 
does not cover the costs. So this is a point SIMA needs to pay careful attention to avoid 
losing revenues (Novoa, 2012). Clients must wait for service outside the harbor, creating 
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bottlenecks if any ship service is concluded before or after the others. The size of the port 
always causes traffics problems for the incoming and outgoing vessels (Novoa, 2012). 
The lack of infrastructure and capacity present the following problems. First there is 
not a sufficient capacity for small and medium sized ship for repairs and maintenance. 
Second, the lack of ability to perform services for large vessels and submarines is a 
reoccurring problem. These problems force SIMA to delay service attention and even reject 
potential clients.  
The consumer response to these service problems has been diverse. There is a small 
group of loyal customers who prefers to wait days or even months to be served by SIMA 
because they value the quality of service. However, they are still unsatisfied by the waiting 
times. Another group looks for other shipyards when SIMA is full and they come back when 
they find free capacity. However, there is group of clients who will not seek SIMA’s services 
again once they are rejected. Appendix 2 shows these numbers. In 2011, more than 60 ships 
were rejected due to capacity issues.   
5.1.6 Marketing 
Lack of market intelligence. The social role and the blindness of SIMA to see 
economic opportunities is holding them back.  The company is used to receiving projects 
from the government without a commercial or marketing division ever proactively seeking 
out work and securing new contracts. For instance, since the company has not had the need of 
looking for private clients and compete with international firms, SIMA has not developed any 
sort of market intelligence. Now that they have more space to work on vessels, SIMA will 
have extra capacity to serve private clients.  Now it is critical that they develop a marketing 
plan.  The company needs to analyze the market and their competitors in order to find the 
attributes which are most valued by clients and the competitive advantages of their rivals. 
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Lack of segmentation and positioning strategy. As a result of the poor marketing 
activities, SIMA has not developed a segmentation, targeting and positioning strategy. It is 
important that once they identify their competitors and their competitive advantages, SIMA 
needs to think in what segment they want to compete and what attributes they want to focus 
on to develop and stand out for. They could compete in cost, location, specialization, time or 
any other attribute valued by the clients. This formulation will be the basis for the 
development of the rest of SIMA’s marketing plan.  
5.2  Main Causes of the Problem 
 
In order to increase profits, the most important measure to take is to shift the focus of 
their business from shipbuilding to repair and maintenance, which has higher margins. For 
this reason, it is important to remove the social role from the administration which is causing 
the company to underperform. Additionally, to be successful in this industry, it is also 
important to correct the marketing shortages, beginning with a new push for market 
intelligence with a positioning strategy for SIMA. In this way, the Implementation Section 
shown in Chapter VIII would develop a market intelligence and positioning strategy for 
SIMA.  
From the other roots presented above, it is important to mention that the company has 
already started changing their machines and infrastructure, with the expansion of the Callao’s 
shipyard. Additionally, the HR division needs to change some policies and take some actions 
to work on the management, workers and working conditions roots. Finally, it is also 
important to establish some purchasing policies to minimize losses in the projects carried out. 





Chapter VI: Assessed Solution Alternatives 
6.1 Alternatives to Solve the Problem 
The solutions have been elaborated based on the different ideas presented in the 
literature review. As explained before an SOE has different types of impacts and KPIs to be 
considered:  social (job creation, education, payroll and benefits), economic (profits, tax 
impact), innovation (R&D investment), brand image and environmental. Therefore, different 
improvements need to be done around the whole organization which are presented in Table 8.  
Table 8 
Key Problems, Roots, Proposed Solutions 
Problem Area Roots Proposed Solutions 
 Human  Government regulation Privatize a branch of the firm 
 Resources High turnover of officers Motivation / Wage and Promotion Policy 
  Lack of Managerial Skills Hire civilians with Business studies 
  Social role blindness Shift focus to repair business 
  Over Specialization of Labor Training in different specialties 
  Inflexible labor contracts Training during slow business periods 
  Inadequate wage and promotion 
policies 
Creation of a wage policy based on results 
and productivity 
  Military commands “Work-out” program 





Lack of a supplier's payment policy Creation of policy / Use of financial 
instruments 
Profits  Purchasing process errors Procurement process manual / Training / 
New indicators / Automated orders 
  Floating prices of materials Use of financial instruments (options) 
 Machines and 
Infrastructure 
Inefficient and obsolete 
infrastructure 
Expansion of shipyard / new docks / 
acquisition of high tech machines 
  Inadequate use of infrastructure Creation of an infrastructure manual 
 Marketing Lack of market Intelligence Conduct competitor analysis 
  Lack of segmentation and 
positioning strategy 
Creation of positioning strategy 
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6.1.1 Changes in HR policies 
Important changes have to be addressed is in the human resources department. First, 
the two-year rotation of officers is not ideal for fostering a sustainable change within the 
company. Marine officers do not have the opportunity to establish a long-term goal. A 
possible solution for SIMA to overcome these challenges would be to extend the rotation of 
marine officers offering new opportunities. SIMA should develop new HR policies that allow 
naval officers to have a long term careers as a manager within the company. By developing a 
new plan, SIMA will be able to have a stronger and more efficient workforce. 
Second, there is a lack of managerial skills among marine officers at SIMA. They do 
not have degrees in business and lack the necessary managerial and business communication 
skills. Despite their extensive knowledgeable in the shipping industry, they need to improve 
their knowledge of the business world. It will be interesting for SIMA to have a business 
training for those marine officers to increase their performance. The company could also 
consider the incorporation of skilled professionals (civilians) into the board of directors and 
managerial positions. 
Third, SIMA’s current wage and perk offers are not attractive. It is common for 
public companies to provide lower wages because they are offering secured positions. It is 
clear that SIMA’s current wages are not attractive, and their promotion policy is not fostering 
efficiency. Employees are being promoted based on seniority, loyalty, and experience. A 
recommended change for the shipping company to implement is to promote their employees 
based on their overall productivity and efficiency. 
Finally, because of its public sector status, there is a lack of communication between 
staff and managers at SIMA. Additionally, it is highly hierarchal, and the government of Peru 
controls processes. Therefore, there is a lack of creativity and innovation. Another possible 
solution is to create a culture of a small company, where all workers feel engaged and 
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everyone has a voice. General Electric's (GE) applied this idea through a program called 
“work-out”. It consisted of sessions where employees were invited to share views about their 
business and recommendations on how to improve it. Employees did not only have the 
opportunity to speak their minds but also got immediate responses from their leaders.  This 
zero-cost initiative reduced unnecessary bureaucracy and increased creativity and 
productivity at GE (Bartlett & Wozny, 2005). 
  By promoting innovation within its workforce, SIMA will have the possibility to 
develop new efficient ways of building or repairing ships. In addition, it will improve the 
motivation of their staff. It is crucial for SIMA to have a strong and loyal workforce that will 
help the company to strengthen their position within this risky industry. 
6.1.2 Changes in procurement and financial policies / practices 
As materials are the largest cost, their optimization is not only essential to improve 
efficiency, but also to increase profitability. First of all, the lack of suppliers' payment policy 
restricts SIMA to make business with larger firms. As a result, the costs and the risks would 
increase due to the lack of economies of scale and the high bargaining power of suppliers. 
One possible solution to fill this gap is to establish a supplier's' payment policy. Certain 
policies should be implemented to guarantee the whole process of payment. Regarding 
international purchases, SIMA should use financial instruments such the bill of credit method 
to guarantee payment and merchandise’s delivery. 
A manual purchasing process is also needed to avoid delays, bottlenecks, and re-
processes. Employee’s training should also be carried out to explain the process and avoid 
mistakes. Additionally, certain indicators should be implemented to examine the performance 
of the employees. Finally, a procurement system that incorporates suppliers could also be 
implemented to automatically send purchasing orders when materials reach low stock levels. 
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Since materials play an important role in the shipbuilding industry, their price directly 
affects the cost of sales and ultimately the company´s profitability. Therefore, SIMA has to 
implement certain financial instruments to minimize the influence of the fluctuation of the 
material price. One possible solution to reduce uncertainty is to purchase options. In this way, 
negative fluctuation of prices would not affect SIMA at the expense of a small amount of 
premium fees.  
6.1.3 Shift of focus for projects      
Despite that the social role is a priority, it has been mentioned in Chapter III that that 
state-owned companies uses their finances as mean to achieve social objectives. For instance, 
SOEs need to remain financially sustainable and commercially competitive to create value 
for the society. In order to generate higher social impacts, SIMA needs to take more private 
projects to generate profits. They could be reinvested on increasing its capacity and investing 
in R&D that would create additional job positions.  
Moreover, as mentioned above the shipping industry is one of the most competitive 
industries in the world and highly globalized. Therefore, it is crucial for companies to 
develop a strong position within this market. A first possible alternative for SIMA would be 
to focus their resources more on ship repairs and maintenance. The ship repairs and 
maintenance market is the most profitable, whereas the shipbuilding market is costly and 
unattractive. SIMA is currently building a new dry dock that will allow them to work on 17 
medium size ships at the same time (>1000 tons) and on vessels up to 2500 tons. This new 




6.1.4 Privatize a branch of the company 
The third option would carry out various extensive changes to the company structure 
by privatizing the ship repairs and maintenance division of SIMA Callao. The repairs and 
maintenance is the most the profitable branch of the company.  If privatized, it would be 
much more free to pursue competitive work and dedicate time to growing the business as 
normal companies do outside the control of the government. 
The social impact SIMA Callao has on the local community is deeply felt in Lima 
with an incredibly positive influence, as mentioned in the first chapter.  The local economy is 
also always greatly affected by the shipyards.  France gives us a clear example.  Three years 
ago, the French shipyard in Saint-Nazaire asked the government to nationalize their 
shipbuilding company.  Their request was dismissed as Hollande did “not want another 
manufacturing failure on his hands” (Boselli, 2013). 
For this reason, the company is managed more safely with the stability provided by 
the government.  Although there is the possibility of turning more profits if it were entirely 
private, but the economic risk of failure is too great.  Additionally, it is believed that this 
alternative would receive high opposition from the government.  
6.2 Assessment of Alternatives 
In order to assess the best possible solution, the alternatives have been scored (in a 1-
3 scale, being 3 the highest) in relation to urgency, suitability, feasibility and acceptability. 
The most suitable solution is the one that generates the highest impact. Then, feasibility 
refers to the economic viability of the alternatives. Finally, acceptability makes reference to 





Assessment of Solutions 





Changes in HR policies 3 1 2 3 9 
Changes in Procurement and 
Finance policies 
2 1 3 3 9 
Shift of Focus 3 3 3 2 11 
Privatize a branch 1 2 3 1 7 
Note. 1-3 scale, being 3 the highest score. 
 
 
The alternative that obtained the highest score is shift of focus (with 11 points), 
followed by changes in HR policies and changes in procurement (both with 9 points) and 
finally, privatization of a branch (with 7 points). It was mentioned that a shift of focus to the 
private sector and the repair and maintenance unit is urgent since SIMA needs to increase its 
profits to be financially sustainable and commercially competitive. Also, this is the 
alternative which has the largest expected impact in net margins. It is also economically 
feasible since SIMA is already building a new shipyard. This new capacity would be 
sufficient as a starting point. Finally, it is expected some resistance from SIMA´s direction 











Chapter VII: Proposed Solution 
 The results of the assessment on the solutions indicates that a shift in SIMA’s 
business focus is the most important solution to be implemented. It has the highest impact, it 
is economically feasible and it is an urgent measure to increase SIMA profits in the short-
term. It is very likely to receive opposition by SIMA's direction once presented. However, it 
is necessary to explain the social impacts that this change could generate.  
 
 
Figure 17. Consequences and impacts of shifting SIMA’s focus to the repair and 
maintenance business. 
 
As explained in Figure 17, the shift of focus will increase SIMA’s profitability 
because the repairs business unit offers higher margins. It was shown in Table 5 that net 
margins of this unit are around 15% in comparison to shipbuilding´s 5% and metalworking´s 
8% margins.  In the short term, profits should be invested in R&D and in the acquisition of 
high-tech equipment to remain commercially competitive and attract private clients. The 
increased quality and service will also increase SIMA's sales. In the long term, profits should 
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be invested in infrastructure to increase capacity. New jobs will be created as a result of the 
additional capacity. At the same time, the increased capacity will generate additional sales 
and profits. Meanwhile, SIMA’s growth will positively impact sales and profits of related 
industries. Lastly, these industries will increase its capacity as demand expands, resulting in 
the creation of new jobs. For instance, it is expected that the shift of focus would create a 





















Chapter VIII: Implementation Plan & Key Success Factors 
8.1 Activities 
As explained before, the strategy of shifting the focus from shipbuilding to repair and 
maintenance, and from public to private sector, requires SIMA to develop a complete 
business plan. The first step is to analyze the industry (especially competitors) and build a 
segmentation and positioning strategy which will serve as the roots of the business plan. 
These two parts are analyzed in the following section. The rest of the business plan and 
implementation will be carried out by SIMA. A Gantt chart is provided to serve as guidance 
for the implementation. It presents the detail of the following phases and the time that each 
phase / activity should take.  
8.1.1 Market Intelligence  
It is important for SIMA to identify its competitors and their positioning strategy. It 
has been mentioned before that shipbuilding’s competition is worldwide since clients will 
look for the shipyard that best fit their requirements and budget. However, in the repair and 
maintenance business, the radius of competition is reduced to the shipyards that are located 
near the ship's routes. In this business, distance and time are crucial since owners incur losses 
during the days that ships remain inoperative. 
For small and medium sized boats, SIMA’s competition is local since this type of boat 
moves only along the Peruvian coast. Meanwhile, the competition spectrum for large and 
Panamax vessels (if SIMA decides to invest in Panamax docks in the future) is multi-
regional, involving all the shipyards of the Pacific routes (Novoa, personal communication, 
July 21, 2016).   
Figure 18 presents the map with the global shipping routes, where all the countries 
involved in the Pacific routes can be observed. It can be noted that SIMA’s competitors 
involve not only South American shipyards but also Central American, North American and 
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Asian ones as well. The level of maritime commerce around the world can also be seen, 
which is categorized by colors. It is observed that the most frequented commerce routes are 
made between North America and Europe and North America and Asia. South American 
routes are still fewer but have large opportunities for growth. 
 
Figure 18. Global shipping routes.  




SIMA’s competitors for small and medium sized ships are made up by some 
seventeen Peruvian shipyards. They are located along the coast in the ports of Callao in Lima, 
Chimbote and Paita at the North, and Ilo at the South. The complete list is shown in Table 10.  
Additionally, there are three shipyards that are working but are not authorized by DICAPI 
(General Direction of Peruvian Coastguards). The first belongs to the fishing company 
Diamante. The second is the Paita Shipyard S.A. commercially called ASPASA. The third is 
 72 
Ancor, which is located in the Callao Naval Base. Figure 19 shows the location of the 
competitors and their capacities. 
 Among the competitors, only three of them have exit to the ocean, which poses direct 
competition for SIMA: Construcciones A. Maggiolo, ASTASA, Varadero Sur and ASPASA. 
Additionally, if considering capacity and sales terms, only Maggiolo represents a direct 
threat. This firm together with SIMA dominates the market as an oligopoly. Lastly, it is 
important to mention that the quality and technology levels of national competitors are very 
low.  
Table 10 
National Competitors of SIMA for Small and Medium Sized Boats 
Firm Port Ocean Exit 
Andina de Desarrollo S.A. "ANDESA" Callao Not working 
Construcciones A. Maggiolo S.A. Callao Yes 
Factoría Naval S.A. Callao No 
H.M. Representaciones S.A. Callao Not working 
Ind. Tecn. Naval Sctensa Callao No 
Servicios Nav. Indust. Callao S.A.C. Callao No 
Ast. Serv. y Mant. Nav. "Serviman S.A." Callao No 
Maestranza Portuaria EIRL Callao No 
J.C. Astilleros S.A. Chimbote Not working 
Astillero Luguensi E.I.R.Ltda. Chimbote No 
Astillero y Servicios Bamar S.A. Chimbote No 
ASTASA Chimbote Yes 
Corporación Pesquera Hillary S.A.C. Chimbote No 
Kon Tiki E.I.R.L. Ilo No 
Varadero Sur Perú S.A. Ilo Yes 
Servicios Tecn. Indust. Metal Naval E.I.R.L. Paita No 
San Francisco Paita No 
Note. Data are from “Market Study of Vessels up to 2000 DWT” by Servicios Industriales de la Marina 








Figure 19. SIMA’s national competitors in the repair business.  
Data are from Análisis Competidores by Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA), 2012e.  
 
 On the other hand, the large vessels industry is composed by bigger and more 
competitive firms mainly located in Chile, Panama, North America and China. Unlike the 
local competition, these companies can handle high capacity and carry out qualified work 
with the latest technology in equipment and infrastructure (Barzola, Bomble, Esquén & 




SIMA's Competitors in the Large-Sized Ships Segment 
Country Company Name Business Max. 
Capacity 
Panamá MEC NR Panamax 
Ecuador Astinave NR 8,000 Ton 
NC 350 Ton 
Asenabra NR 20,000 
Dwt * 
NC 700 Ton 
Vatadur NR 2,500 Ton 
NC 2,500 Ton 




Asmar Valparaíso NR -   
  
Asmar Magallanes NR 3,570 Ton 
Sociber NR 10,000 Ton 
Asenav NC 1,000 Ton 
NR 1,000 Ton 
Marco Chilena Iquique NC 1,000 Ton 
NR 1,000 Ton 
Marco Chilena 
Talcahuano 
NR 1,000 Ton 
Detroit Chile NC 1,200 Ton 
NR 1,200 Ton 
Ascon NC -   
Colombi
a 
Bocagrande NR 96,000 
Dwt 
Mamonal NR 96,000 
Dwt 
Note. RN= Naval Repair, NC= Naval Constructions. Data are from “Market Study of Vessels up to 2000 DWT” 
by Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA), 2012c.  
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8.1.2 Positioning Analysis  
In order to analyze the positioning and competitive advantages of SIMA’s 
competitors, five possible attributes of differentiation have been identified: (a) quality, (b) 
location, (c) cost, (d) capacity and (e) connectivity. Quality can be measured by the number 
of ISOs and certifications of each firm. Location is measured by the distance to important 
markets by sea and land.   
Costs are determined mainly by the labor wages of each country, since the repair 
business is labor intensive. Therefore, labor costs differences among countries directly relates 
to a competitive advantage for the ship repair business. Figure 20 shows the hourly 
compensation costs in the manufacturing industry for a number of different countries. It can 
be noted that Latin America labor costs (represented by Mexico, Argentina and Brazil) 
fluctuates around $6 and $20, Japan $35, South Korea $21 and China less than $5. In 
summary, China is the cost leader, followed by Latin American countries, South Korea, and 
Japan.  
In order to analyze the labor costs in the region, minimum wages have been 
compared. Colombia has the lowest minimum wage between compared countries of $233. 
They are followed by Peru ($258), Ecuador ($366), Chile ($373) and Panama ($529)  
(Federacion Interamericana de Asociaciones de Gestion Humana, 2016).  
Capacity refers to the number, type and size of vessels that a shipyard can give 
service. It depends in the size of the shipyard and the parking space, the type of docks, the 
use of cranes and specialized equipment. For example, in South America only Chile and 
Panama have docks for Panamax ships. Also, they have specialized equipment for cutting 
submarines that few shipyards have.  
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Figure 20. Hourly compensation costs in manufacturing, US dollars 2010, 2013. 
Compensation costs include direct pay, social insurance expenditures and labor related taxes. 
Data from “International Comparisons of Hourly Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 
2013”, The Conference Board, 2014 
(https://www.conference-board.org/ilcprogram/index.cfm?id=28269). 
 
Finally, connectivity and integration to the international maritime system can be 
measured with the LSCI (Liner Shipping Connectivity Index). This index aims to gage the 
country's level of integration with the existing liner shipping network by measuring liner 
connectivity.  The index is calculated based on four major components: (a) number of 
shipment calls, (b) capacity of containers, (c) number of shipping companies, liner services or 
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vessels per company, (d) and average and maximum vessel size (Rodriguez, 2016). As 
displayed in Table 12, Peru’s maritime connectivity places above Ecuador and slightly higher 
than Chile.  If this index is compared to other pacific countries such as Colombia, Panama, it 
suggests that Peru has still a lot of growth potential, related mainly with the port 
infrastructure and the repair and maintenance services supply. 
Table 12 









South Korea 113.2 
China 167.1 





Description. SIMA is a Peruvian state-owned company with experiences over 170 
years. It was created to provide shipbuilding and technical services to the Peruvian Navy. 
Operations are performed in their three facilities: Callao, Chimbote, Iquitos. 
Mission. The Industrial Services Marine SA carries out the maintenance, 
modernization and construction of the Peruvian Navy’s ships and executes projects related to 
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Shipbuilding and Mechanical Metal for the state and private sector, national and abroad, with 
the most stringent quality standards, in order to contribute to the national defense and the 
socio-economic and technological development of the country (Servicios Industriales de la 
Marina, 2016). 
Technology. It has been explained that some of the equipment used at SIMA is 
obsolete, especially the machines used for electricity, air compression, and the gas and water 
supply setup.  In comparison to the largest shipyards of the world equipped with latest 
systems, it is clear that SIMA has a lot to improve.  
Positioning criteria 
Quality. The company has an Integrated Management System (IMS) oriented to 
provide goods and services that meet quality standards and customer’s demands. The IMS 
incorporates mechanisms for environmental impact, pollution prevention, and workplace 
injuries prevention. They also have systems in place to deter any possible breaches of the 
company or civil law, which directly affects workers and stakeholders.  SIMA has obtained 
the following certifications (Servicios Industriales de la Marina, 2014b): 
 ISO 9001 (quality of products and processes) 
 ISO 14001 (environmental practices) 
 OHSAS 18001 (health and safety management)  
 BASC (safety)  
Location. Peru has a privileged location at the center of the South American west coast. 
Callao port is a competitive distance to most Asian countries. Also, as stated before, the 
maritime commerce in the Pacific Ocean has large opportunities for growth, especially with 
the Asian market. For this reason, it is of special importance for Peru to develop the required 
infrastructure to receive large Panamax Vessels and become the entrance port to the country. 
Figure 21 shows the Peruvian routes to the main ports of the Asia Pacific.  
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Figure 21. Peruvian routes to the main ports of Asia Pacific.  





Costs. As shown in Figure 20, Peru has the lowest labor costs of the region together 
with Colombia. The average wage is also below Japan's, and Korea's but above China's.  
Capacity. SIMA counts on three facilities to perform repair services: Callao with 
capacity for vessels up to 25,000 DWT, Chimbote with capacity up to 1300 tons and Iquitos 
for river boats. The facility of Callao, which is the largest and most important, has an area of 
300,000m2. Repair services are performed in the four docks presented in the  Table 13. 
Table 13 
 
SIMA Callao´s Docks  
 
Docks Length Beam Cranes 
Dry Dock 194.8m 26.8m 2 
Floating Dock ADF 104 115.8m 23.3m 2 
Floating Dock ADF 106 87.8m 13.7m - 
Floating Dock ADF 107 126m 15.5m - 
Note. Data are from “Plan Estrategico 2009-2013” by Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA), 2008a.  
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SIMA’s repair unit serves the following type of ships: tankers, bulk carriers, container 
ship, tuna fishing ships and fishing boats for national and non-national shipowners. The main 
repair services they provide are: sandblasting, hull repair works, propulsion and steering 
systems repair, boiler making works, maintenance of diesel engines, among others. 
Connectivity. As shown in Table 12, Peru has lower levels of connectivity in 
comparison to Asian countries. In the region, it has similar levels to Chile but higher levels 
Ecuador but lower than Panama and Colombia. This may be explained by the trade volume in 
the country, and the development of shipping infrastructure.  
Construcciones A. Maggiolo 
 General information 
Description. Maggiolo is a private shipyard founded in 1942 at the Callao Port.  It is 
focuses on shipbuilding, maintenance and repair (Construcciones A. Maggiolo, 2016a). 
Mission. “Provide services related to the repair, construction and modification of 
ships and craft solutions; based on our competence, creativity and commitment; exceeding 
the expectations of our customers” (Construcciones A. Maggiolo, 2016a). 
Technology. Oquendo shipyard counts with four cranes up to 100 tons, generators and 
compressors, tanks, underwater welding arc machines, oxicorte and plasma cutting machines 
and elevators (Construcciones A. Maggiolo, 2016b). 
Positioning criteria 
Quality.  Maggiolo counts with the following certifications (Construcciones A. 
Maggiolo, 2016c): 
 SGS: Repair and construction of artifacts and marine vessels. 
 ISO 9001: Repair and construction of artifacts and marine vessels. 
 American Bureau of Shipping: Certification Service of hull's thickness 
measurement and welding procedure specifications and qualification of welders. 
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 Bureau Veritas: Certification Service of hull's thickness measurement. 
 Det Norske Veritas:  Certification Service of hull's thickness measurement. 
 American Welding Society: Inspectors of welding and nondestructive trials. 
Location. A Maggiolo is also located as Callao, Lima having a privileged location 
over other south American countries. 
Costs. As shown in Figure 20, Peru presents the lowest labor costs of the region 
together with Colombia. The average wage is also below the level found Japan and Korea but 
above the prices China offers.  
Capacity. The company owns two shipyards: Chucuito and Oquendo. Chucuito 
occupies a total area of 10,000 m2.  It has 2 docks for ships up to 52 m. long and weighing 
1,000 ton. This shipyard serves up to 100 boats a year. In 2010, the company started the 
operations of the new facility of Oquendo. It has the capacity to serve ships of up to 110 
meters long and 2,500 ton. The shipyard has one dock, a mounting unit of 250 meters and a 
launch skid for oil platforms (Construcciones A. Maggiolo, 2016d). Maggiolo is specialized 
in maintenance for the following type of boats: fishing, harbour tugs and Offshore Supply 
Vessels (OSV), barges between 60 and 100 meters, tankers and gas carriers of up to 100 
meters and  foreign fishing vessels (Construcciones A. Maggiolo, 2016a). 
Connectivity. As explained in SIMA’s section, Peru has low levels of connectivity but 
has a promising future for growing their business.  
Asmar and Asenav, Chile 
General information 
Description. Between the three main ship repair companies in Chile, Asmar, Asenav, 
and Detroit S.A., Asenav presents itself as the most competitive for the commercial 
shipbuilding and repair industry.  Asmar is a publically owned and operated company and 
was founded in 1895.  Like SIMA, a good portion of their time is spent on government 
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contracts.  Asmar builds primarily for the Chilean and Ecuadorian navy, and for the Icelandic 
government (Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada, 2015). Lastly, Asenav was founded in 
1972; by 2012, they had produced over 170 vessels of varying sizes.  They offer a range of 
services for the maintaining and repair of vessels (Asenav, n.d.) 
Positioning criteria 
Quality. Asenav promotes their industry work as being competitive with the major 
European shipbuilding companies, they do not publish any certifications (Asenav, n.d.). 
Asmar, on the other hand, has a number of them: International Standards ISO-9001:2008 
(Quality), OSHAS 18001:2007 (Safety and Occupational Health) and ISO 14001:2004 
(Environment), (Asmar, 2015). 
Location. Asenav offers competitive locations for vessels needing service in sense 
that they have three shipyards along the south Chilean coast (Asenav, n.d.). However, Peru's 
more central location offers a more logistical point for repairs than Chile's repairing ports in 
Valparaiso, Talcahuano and Valdivia (refer to Figure 19) since they are so far south.  The 
Callao shipyard caters well to the Asian Pacific routes.  Unless going around the southern tip, 
the Chilean repair ports would be too often out of the way for most shipping routes. 
Costs. As mentioned in the section above, the labor costs are significantly lower in 
Latin America.  However, as explained before Chile and Panama have the highest labor costs 
in the region.   
Capacity. Of the three main Chilean Shipyards, Asmar offers the most extensive 
services.  They offer both dry docks and afloat repairs, depending on the needs of the client.  
They have a broad range of specializations in Valparaiso which include: Thermal Insulation, 
Boilers and Heat Exchangers, Piping, Carpentry, Diesel Engines, Turbochargers, Gas 
turbines, Electrical Machinery, etc (Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada, 2015).  
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In the Talcahauno Shipyard, the facilities include: two dry docks, five floating docks 
(two of them roofed), over 1,100 m of berths and mooring sites with associated services, a 
new building slipway, and modern production centers in areas such as structures, electric, 
mechanics, diesel engines, machine-tools, boilers and piping, electronics, weapon systems, 
weapon mechanics, etc that support maintenance, repair, modernization, conversion, refit, 
and shipbuilding activities (Astilleros y Maestranzas de la Armada, 2015). 
Connectivity. Peru offers a strategic point for a good volume of ship routes who 
regularly cross the Asian Pacific.  Perhaps SIMA Callao is not as competitive as the port in 
Panama since it has access to ships on both sides of America, but it still presents itself as a 
central point in shipping routes for South America. 
Astilleros Navlaes Ecuatorianos (ASTINAVE), Ecuador 
General information 
Description. ASTINAVE is a private maritime company based in Guayaquil, 
Ecuador.  The shipbuilding company was created in 1907 when the president of Ecuador 
“decreed a regulation to create a marine Arsenal in the Guayaquil Port” (Astilleros Navlaes 
Ecuatorianos, 2015).  
Mission. “Develop, produce and maintain solutions to enhance the defense, security 
and the maritime industry” (Astilleros Navlaes Ecuatorianos, 2015). 
Technology. ASTINAVE has two different plants and each plant has its own 
workshop. The central plant and the south plant both have eight different workshops: 
welding, metalworking, electricity, electronic system, engines, auxiliary system, habitability 
and accessories, and surface preparation and painting. 
Positioning criteria 
Quality. ASTINAVE has an Integrated Management System (IMS) which allows 
them to deliver high quality service to their customers. In 2014, ASTINAVE was awarded by 
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the Ministry of Industry and Productivity. The company was recognized for having an ethical 
strategy which meets the four pillars of corporate social responsibility (Astilleros Navlaes 
Ecuatorianos, 2015). ASTINAVE EP also holds the following certifications: 
 ISO 9001: quality management 
 ISO 14001: management of environmental responsibilities 
 OHSAS 18001: international occupational health and safety management system 
specification (OHSAS 18001, 2015) 
Cost. Ecuador presents a medium-high labor cost in the region ($366).  
Capacity. ASTINAVE has a floating dock and provides both shipbuilding and ship 
repairs’ services. ASTINAVE has two main plants.  The central plant has the capacity of 
building ships up to 2,000 tons.  They can repair vessels up to 700 tons and also provide 
design and production for command and control systems. The second main plant provides 
maintenance for vessels up to 6,000 tons (Astilleros Navlaes Ecuatorianos, 2015). 
ASTINAVE is specialized in maintenance and can carry out repairs for the following vessels: 
 Coastal combat boats: LR-AST-0702 
 Reaction and interceptor’s boats: LP-AST-0802, LP-AST-1103, LP-AST-1304 
 Coast guards boats: LG-AST-2606, LG-AST-4207 
 Line defense vessels: CM-AST-9813 
 Multipurpose vessels: BM-AST-8213 
Recently, the ship company has awarded from Daman Shipyards Group a contract for 
a fourth patrol vessel. “In the last few years, ASTINAVE has built a great number of vessels 
in cooperation with Damen, including tugs, cutter suction dredgers, fast crew suppliers and 
patrol vessels” (World Maritime, 2014).   
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The company is planning on building a world class shipyard with two docks that will 
produce four Aframa vessels per year. Their main customer for these ships is the state-owned 
company FLOPEC in Ecuador. This new dry dock will allow the company to hire 3,000 more 
employees while improving their position for Ecuador in the shipbuilding industry. In 
addition, ASTINAVE will relocate its plant to improve its capacity. They will be able to 
create two offshore supply vessel (OSV). The company will create 500 more jobs 
opportunities (Ministerio Coordinador de Sectores Estratégicos, 2014). 
Connectivity. As shown on Table 12, the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index 2015, 
Ecuador scores 21.7, placing it at the bottom of the list. It shows that Ecuador has a poor 
connectivity shipping infrastructure.  
 Cotecmar, Colombia 
General information 
Description. Cotecmar Shipyard is located in Cartagena, Colombia. The shipbuilding 
company was created by the Colombian National Army thanks to an association with 
Nacional University. Cotecmar develops vessels for the army and private customers. In 
addition, the company is offering full line of ship repair and marines services such as diesel 
engine installation and repairs. Coctemar is a science and technology corporation that have 
strong relation with university-company and prioritize research and development in new 
technology and business practices (Cotecmar, 2016). 
Mission. Cotecmar offers advanced solutions to the maritime community in various 
sectors: military, industrial, commercial or private (Cotecmar, 2016). 
Technology. The company owns machines and propulsion lines, welding and piping 
systems, electrical equipment and diesel engines (Cotecmar, 2016). 
 86 
Positioning criteria 
Quality. Cotecmar Shipyard fulfills the requirement of Llyod's Register. Cotecmar 
operates in accordance with CT DE and EPA NESHAP regulations. In addition, the company 
has the ISO 9001-2008 certification. 
Location. The shipyard is based in the Cartagena's Bay and is only 180 miles away 
from the Panama Canal (Cotecmar, 2016). Figure 23 shows its privileged location with 
access to the routes of the Atlantic Ocean and to the pacific through Panama's Canal. 
Cost. As stated before, Colombia has the lowest labor costs of the region ($233). The 
average cost is below Japan and South Korea’s prices, but above China's. 
Capacity. The company possess two different facilities. The first one, Mamonal has 
eight docking positions and four different afloat repair locations. In addition, at Mamonal, 
Coctemar have the capacity to lift vessels up to 3,600 tons and 117m of length. The second 
facility, Bocagrande, has the capacity of lifting 1,900 ton ships up to 66.5m of length. 
Cotecmar is specialized in the field of scientific and technology research in the maritime 
industry. The company has a strong competitive advantage in the area by being an innovative 
leader in the ship industry (Papadakis Shipyards Brokers & Co., n.d.). 
Connectivity. From Table 12 which shows the Liner Shipping Connectivity Index 
2015, Colombia scored 42.3. This country has a low-medium connectivity of shipping. 




Figure 22. Cotecmar shipyard´s location.  





Description. MEC is a major international ship repair facility located in the port of 
Balboa, Panama. MEC Panama is under the control of a Corporate Governance. MEC 
Panama established its strategies based on its directors and stakeholders needs by enhancing 
the context of the social, regulatory and market environment (MEC Panama, 2016). 
Mission. It is the mission of the entire staff of MEC Panama to provide the best value 
in ship repairs for the North and South American continents. “Our goal is to provide proper 
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ship repairs at a reasonable price, in a predictable and agreed allotted time, at an acceptable 
level of quality” (MEC Panama, 2016).  
Technology. MEC Panama is specialized in the ship repair industry and they are the 
only company that possess a hyperbaric chamber in the region. The diving time of their 
operator surpasses all other companies' by more than 40% (MEC Panama, 2016). They also 
own underwater brush cleaning machines that improve the speed of their customers' ship. The 
Balboa Shipyard has a 400 ton hydraulic press, an automated MIG, TIG welding equipment, 
a steel plating unit and pipe shops with computerized cutters (MEC Panama, 2016).  
Positioning criteria 
Quality. MEC’s shipyard demonstrates strong quality policies.  They have received 
the ISO 9001 and 2008 certificates in 2014. 
Location. MEC Panama owns two different shipyards. Balboa Shipyard is located in 
the port of Balboa at the Pacific Entrance of the Panama Canal. The second shipyard, 
Veracruz is located at the West of Balboa (MEC Panama, 2016). Panama has a privileged 
location with access to the pacific and Atlantic Ocean.  
Cost. As observed before, Panama has the highest labor cost of the region ($529) and 
is above Japan, South Korea and China. 
Capacity.  MEC Panama owns three dry docks for vessels up to Panamax size with 
over than 12,000 sqm of fully equipped workshop (MEC Panama, 2016). In addition, the 
shipbuilding company provides 24 hours’ afloat repairs service. Veracruz Shipyard has the 
capacity to repair eight ships at a time: four vessels up to 40 meters, two vessels up to 20 






Description of MEC´s Docks  
Dock 





1 318m x 39m 33m 7.9m 1.75m 
1043ft x 128ft 110ft 26ft 5ft 9in 
2 130m x 30.5m 26m 6.4m 1.75m 
426.5ft x 100ft 85ft 21ft 5ft 9in 
3 70m x 17m 17m 4.3m 1.46m 
230ft x 55ft 55ft 14ft 4.8ft 
Note. Data are from “Shipyards”, MEC Panama, 2015 
(http://www.mecpanama.com/shipyards.html). 
 
Connectivity. Panama got a score of 45.6 and this is the best score among the Latin 
American countries.  However, it is still below Japan, USA, South Korea and China.  
Hyundai Heavy Industries, South Korea 
General information  
Description. Hyundai Shipbuilding Division, is the world's number one shipbuilder. 
Chung Ju-yung, the founder of Hyundai Group, stepped into the ship industry during the 
1970’s, creating Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI).  Only 10 years after its first delivery, the 
firm reached a production size of 10 million DWT in vessel size. Since that time, the 
company has maintained its leading position in the shipbuilding industry. The company 
operates in two dockyards: Samho Heavy Industries and Hyundai Mipo Dockyard 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012a). 
Mission. “To consistently deliver unrivalled products and services. We are also 
committed to delivering superior satisfaction to our customers, more rewarding careers for 
our employees, and greater value to our clients” (“Mission Statement”, 2016). 
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Technology. Hyundai counts on their innovative and cutting-edge technology. Their 
industrial robots have been designated as world-class by the Korean government. They also 
have a strong green energy division (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2012a). 
Positioning criteria 
Quality. HHI has the ISO 14001, OHSAS 18001 and ISO 9001(Hyundai Mipo 
Docyard, 2016a). 
Location. South Korea has a great location, since it has access to different shipping 
routes on the Pacific and Atlantic. However, it is located close to its big competitors like 
China who offer cheaper labor costs for services. 
Cost. Korea's labor cost is medium-high, above Japan, slightly higher than Latin 
American countries and significantly higher than China.  
Capacity. Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co., Ltd. has four docks and four quays with the 
capacity of serving PANAMAX vessels (Hyundai Mipo Docyard, 2016b). The capacity is 
detailed in Table 15. Additionally, Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (HSHI) has 
two mega docks with a building capacity of 3.7 million GT per year and five Goliath cranes 
of a maximum lifting limit of 1200 tons and 900 tons (Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries, 
2013). See Table 16 for details. With Panamax capacities and facilities, HHI builds and 
repairs a wide range of vessels: bulk carriers, tankers, container carriers, multipurpose 
carriers, car carriers, gas carriers, drill ships, offshore support vessels, offshore barges, tug 







Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co. Docks  
Dock Capacity Dimension Crane/Service 
L(m) W(m) H(m) 
No.1 Dock 400,000DWT 380 65 12.5 200Ton Kib Crane 3 
80Ton Kib Crane 1 
No.2 Dock 400,000DWT 380 65 12.5 200Ton Kib Crane 2 
No.3 Dock 400,000DWT 380 65 12.5 200Ton Kib Crane 3 
80Ton Kib Crane 1 
No.4 Dock 350,000DWT 380 76 12.5 200Ton Kib Crane 2 




Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries Co. Docks 
Assortment NO.1 Dock NO.2 Dock 
Size (L x B x D) 504m x 100m x 13m 594m x 104m x 13m 
Max. Building Capacity 800,000 DWT 1,000,000 DWT 
Crane (Type & 
Capacity) 
Goliath 600 Ton x 2 
Jib 80 Ton x 1 
Jib 40 Ton x 4 
Goliath 900 Ton x 2 
Jib 40 Ton x 2 
Note. Data are from “Shipbuilding Division: Introduction Capacity”, Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries, 2013 
(http://eng.hshi.co.kr/business/business01_2.asp). 
  
Connectivity. Korea's connectivity index score of 113.2 places them in second place 
after China. This indicates that South Korea has great shipping infrastructure, and a 
developed shipping system. As a result, this country receives a great number of ships to work 
on for repair and maintenance services. 
 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Japan 
General information  
Description. Yataro Iwasako is the founder of the private Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 
(Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 2016a). There are three company subsidiaries that offer 
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shipbuilding and repair services: Yokohama Dockyard & Machinery Works, Nagasako 
Shipyards & Machining Works and Shimonoseki Shipyard & Machine Works (Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries, 2014).  
Mission. MHI has established “Our Technologies, Your Tomorrow” as its corporate 
identity. This represents MHI's commitment to providing an sure future where people can 
lead safe, secure, and enriched lives for the sustainability of the earth and humankind with 
help from MHI's impressive technologies and passion (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 2016b). 
Technology. The company use high tech design to reduce environmental impact.  
“MHI has integrated the 3D plant measurement technology at its nuclear power sector with 
the 3D CAD vessel design technique, actively promoting the engineering to repair vessels 
currently in service” ((Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 2013). 
Positioning criteria 
Quality. MHI counts with the following certifications (Mitsubishi Hitachi Power 
Systems, 2016).  
 ISO 9001: Quality Management System 
 ISO 14001:  Environmental Management System 
 OHSAS 18001:  Occupational Health & Safety Assessment Series. 
Location. Japan has the shortest distance to America. However, as it is an island it has 
no connection by land to other countries and thus has low chances of becoming a hub. 
Cost. As shown in Figure 20, Japan has the most expensive labor cost in comparison 
to the other Asian and American countries. There is a significant gap of over $30 USD in 
relation to that of China. 
Capacity. Nagasaki Shipyard & Machinery Works (main plant) has three dry docks 
that support vessels up t o 270,000 DWT. Shimonoseki Shipyard & Machinery Works has 
three dry docks, one floating dock, seven piers, and 10 jib cranes. The dock can facilitate 
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ships up to the 270,000 DWT (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 2016a). “We can perform all 
kinds of damage repair work” (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 2016c).  
With Panamax capacities and facilities the company is able to service all kinds of 
repairing works for LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) ships, naval vessels, ferries, passenger 
ships, foundation improvement barges, replacement of propeller shafts and damage repair 
work (Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 2016d). Table 17 shows the capacity of Shimonoseki 
Shipyard´s Docks. 
Table 17 
Shimonoseki Shipyard´s Docks 
Dock 
No. 
Length(m) Width(m) Depth(m) Deadweight 
Capacity(t) 
Crane 
(t  x m) 
No.1 350.0 60.0 08.8 270,000 16/64x40/80 
80/35x40/65 
No.2 270.0 60.0 09.8 120,000 80/35x40/65 
40/15x40/65 
16/6x40/80 
No.3 180.0 30.0 10.7 038,000 10/5x40/60 
16/6x40/80 
Note. Data are from “Ship repair: Dry docks”, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 2016e 
(http://www.mhi-global.com/products/detail/dry_docks.html). 
 
Table 18 shows the capacity of Japanese yards in number of docks and berths. MHI 
has the largest number of berths (6), Tsuneishi has the highest number of docks (5) and 
Universal Shipbuilding company the largest dock length (620m) ((Organization for 







Japanese Yards Capacity 
Shipbuilder Yard # 
Docks 












Oshima 1 - 299 80 8 
Tsuneishi Zosen Numakuma 5 2 380 59 15 
Namura Shipbuilding Imari 1 - 450 70 17 
Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries 
Nagasaki 3 6 375 56 19 
Imabari Shipbuilding Marugame 2 - 370 57 22 
Universal Shipbuilding Tsu 2 4 500 75 33 
Imabari Shipbuilding Saijo 1 1 420 89 34 
Sanoyas Mizushima 3 - 270 80 41 
Koyo Dock KK Mihara 5 5 378 59 47 
Universal Shipbuilding Ariake 2 1 620 85 50 
Note. Data are from “Peer review of the Japanese shipbuilding industry: Yard capacity-dock statistics”, The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012b 
(https://www.oecd.org/industry/ind/PeerReview-Shipbuilding-Japan.pdf). 
 
Connectivity. The Liner Shipping Connectivity Index of Japan is 68.8.  It is 
significantly lower than China and South Korea but it is higher than Latin American 
countries.   
China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), China 
General information 
Description. CSSC was formed in July 1982 by a group of several shipyards and 
association of marine equipment manufacturing and research companies. The company 
mainly focuses on shipbuilding, maintenance and repair as well as the production of Marine 
auxiliary vessels (Krishnan, 2011). 
Mission. “Follow the market and capabilities, to grasp the rhythm, and control risk” 
(CSSC, 2007). 
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Technology. CSSC has advanced mechanized equipment in the repair docks and a 
variety of test equipment. Also dozens of world-renowned brands of marine equipment have 
been established in the repair center to further improve the quality of service (CSSC, 2007).   
Positioning criteria 
Quality. The firm counts with the following quality certifications (CSSC, 2007): 
 ISO 9001: Quality Management System 
 GB/T 24001: Guobiao standards 
 ISO 14001: Environmental Management System 
 OHSAS 18001: Occupational Health & Safety Assessment Series 
 Pattern: CSSC has over 1000 patterns till 2015 
Location. Regarding geographic location, it can be argued that Hong Kong together 
with London, Singapore and Busan have been ranked as the best ports around the world. 
Some of the criteria includes the volume of the port and the environmental conditions 
(Jakobsen, Mellbye & Sørvig, 2015). 
Cost. China’s labor cost is significantly lower in comparison to the other countries. It 
gives them an important competitive advantage, allowing them to offer the lowest repair 
prices of the world's industry. 
Capacity.  In 2011, CSSC achieved the shipbuilding goals of 57 ships, which is 
approximately 9.33 million tons of capacity. In 2015, CSSC accomplished a total ship repair 
goal of 301 ships. CSSC services rank from civilian ships, conventional tankers and bulk 
carriers to large container ships with the contemporary international advanced level. This 
forms a multi-species, multi- grade service system (Krishnan, 2011). 
Connectivity. As Table 12 suggests, China has the highest levels of connectivity of all 
the other countries. In Asia, South Korea has the closest index, being an important 
competitor. 
 96 
8.1.3  Segmentation and Positioning Results 
The results of the positioning analysis are shown in Table 19. It can be noted that 
China is the most competitive country offering good quality and location, the lowest costs in 
the industry, high capacity of attention with Panamax services and the highest connectivity 
between the analyzed countries. It is followed by South Korea, Panama and Japan. The South 
American Countries are ranked at lower positions, SIMA being the most competitive 
company in the region. 
SIMA offers the best combination of price (cost) and quality and location in the 
region. Although SIMA competes with other South American countries in quality, it beats 
them in cost and location. However, Chile and Panama have a higher capacity which includes 
Panamax repair services. Therefore, if SIMA wants to increase its competitiveness, a 
Panamax dock is needed plus an increase of capacity for medium and large size vessels.  
Also, the firm needs to replace its obsolete equipment with newer technology in order to 
guarantee quality and increase productivity.  
Finally, in segmentation SIMA is participating in the repair and maintenance industry 
from small to large vessels up to 194.8m. Currently, they do not have a dock for Panamax 
ships. Finally, they are now building new infrastructure to serve submarines up to 2000 tons, 





 SIMA and its Competitors Positioning Analysis 
 
Note.  Scale 1 to 5,  being 5 the highest possible score.




























     1. Quality # Certifications 5 4 3 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 
      2. Location Distance to 
large markets 
3 3 2 2 2 5 2 4 3 5 
      3. Cost Labor Costs 4 4 3 3 3 2 4 2 3 5 
      4. Capacity Docks capacity 
and diversity of 
vessels and 
services  
3 2 5 3 3 5 3 5 5 5 
5. Connectivity LSCI 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 3.5 4 5 




8.2 Implementation Gantt Chart 
 
 The report has provided the three first steps of a business plan: industry analysis, 
competitors analysis and segmentation and positioning strategy. The first step, the industry 
analysis, is provided in Chapter 1. Competitors analysis and segmentation and positioning 
strategy are developed in the previous sections of this chapter.  
Now, SIMA has to finish the strategy formulation and continue with the rest of the 
marketing plan and implementation. A Gantt Chart is shown in Figure 24 with the detail of 
the following phases.  In the implementation phase it has been considered the other two 
solutions assessed in Chapter VI: Changes in HR policies and Changes in Procurement and 
Financial Practices. Other recommended activities such as attendance at The International 
Workboat Show and The Maintenance World Expo are detailed in the implementation plan.  
Not all the activities of the implementation plan require an investment since most of 
the proposed solutions are directed to policy changes and negotiations that should be 
developed by managers of SIMA’s divisions. For instance, the administration, HR, finance 
and procurement activities related to policies, training, internal communication and 
negotiations do not require investment. The marketing activities, which includes SIMA’s 
attendance to two ship repair’s shows and the firm’s website remodeling are valued at 
$15,000. One large investment would be the acquisition of the ERP software. These can vary 
between $2M to $17M depending on the brand (SAP, Oracle and Microsoft) (Wailgum, 
2009). Lastly the purchase of new machines and equipment are already considered by the 
firm´s management in the expansion plan of the new shipyard, which is valorized in 430MM 







Figure 23. Further steps Gantt.  
Planning activities do not require a monetary investment since they should be developed by the firm´s managers. 
































































8.3 Key Success Factors 
8.3.1 Enablers 
 In order to shift the business focus and be successful, diverse enablers are required. 
First, it is important to convince marine officers who are at the direction of the company. The 
approval of FONAFE may also be needed or any other government entity. Additionally, to 
achieve growth and higher profits, SIMA needs to acquire high-tech equipment and increase 
its capacity. The shipyard expansion that is planned for 2019 has to be concluded.  
Additionally, in order to grow at a higher scale and transform Callao´s Port into a 
shipping hub, SIMA needs to invest in a Panamax dock. It is also important to negotiate 
growth with the government and eliminate some of SIMA’s marketing restrictions (as 
publishing advertisements) in order to attract new clients.  
8.3.2 Risks 
The risks are related to the enablers. The proposal's major risk is that SIMA direction 
or the government rejects it. Thus it is important to convince them, explaining the large social 
benefits that will be generated. Another possible scenario is to get small collaboration from 
employees. However, this event has low probabilities since changes include a new wage and 
promotion policy that is beneficial for them. These policies should be planned carefully so 
that SIMA maintains its labor cost advantage over other South American countries. Finally, it 
is possible that Maggiolo increases capacity and quality or offers better prices in comparison 





Chapter IX: Expected Outcomes 
After switching their business focus to ship repairs and maintenance, SIMA will enjoy 
both positive financial and social outcomes. It is crucial for SIMA to invest in research and 
development concerning offers of the best technology and business practices in the region. 
Then, if SIMA improves its infrastructure, their capacity will also increase. 
The first expected outcome of switching business focus is financial. Indeed, as 
mentioned above, SIMA never has experienced a financial profit above 3%. The shipbuilding 
industry is highly competitive and offer small profits. Therefore, SIMA needs to change its 
focus to the repair and maintenance business unit that offer higher margins. For instance, 
MEC Panama is one of the most competitive companies in the region, and they specialized 
their primary business in repair and maintenance (MEC Panama, 2016). 
It is crucial to define the impact of implementing the solution. By switching its focus 
to ship repairs and maintenance, SIMA would be able to attract more private customers and 
improve its current services. Therefore, the Peruvian company will be able to enhance its 
profits. It is interesting to compare different companies, to assess the possible effect of the 
solution in SIMA’s margins. 
 Detroit Chile is a perfect example of a ship company that is successful. As shown on 
Table 6, the Chilean company obtained a profit of 9.15% in 2014. However, it is essential to 
acknowledge the fact that Detroit is a private corporation, and SIMA is a state-owned 
company. Therefore, a reasonable financial expected outcome from switching its business 
focus will be between 5-6% of profit. 
The second expected result would be to improve the social impacts of SIMA. New 
profits would be invested in the expansion of the shipyard which would create new job 
opportunities for Peruvians. For instance, Ecuador is investing in a new shipyard that would 
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allow the company to have two more dry docks and hire more than 3000 workers (Ministerio 
Coordinador de Sectores Estratégicos, 2014).  
Additionally, SIMA´s profits could also be invested in quality infrastructure and 
technology to meet private client´s expectations. This would allow SIMA to increase 
productivity and reduce costs and their services’ times. In addition, this would increase 
SIMA’s reputation as offering quality services. 
In a nutshell, by switching its business focus, SIMA will improve its financial profits 
and will be able to invest in new technologies. Also, the company will support the Peruvian 
economy by offering new job opportunities for Peruvians. In addition, SIMA´s growth would 
also affect related industries. Their local suppliers would also grow as a consequence, 
creating new job positions. Finally, tax collection would also increase with revenues growth 
of SIMA and its related businesses. 
The expected financial results are explained in Table 20. In 2015, repair sales of 
SIMA accounted for 123MM soles with a capacity of repairing seven small ships at a time in 
Callao´s shipyard. The repair´s sales of 2015 are considered a good basis since during that 
year non shipbuilding works were performed and the whole capacity was used in the repair 
and metal working business units. Sales to private clients represented 16% and the firm 
obtained a 2.3% net margin.  
Next year, the new shipyard would be inaugurated which has the capacity to serve 
four more ships at the same time. Therefore, it is expected to increase sales to 200MM soles. 
The new capacity should be used to serve private clients; therefore, private sales are expected 
to represent 40% of total revenues. If private sales increases in the repairs’ business thence, 
net margins would also increase. The objective for 2017 is to increase it from 2.3% to 5%.  
Finally, the second phase of the new shipyard would be ready for 2019. By then, 
SIMA Callao would be able to repair 17 ships at the time and sales would increase to 300MM 
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soles. The proportion of private sales should increase to 50% against total revenues. Lastly, 
the objective net margin for this year is 6%. 
Table 20 




Data are from “Memoria Annual” by Servicios Industriales de la Marina (SIMA), 2016.  
b  
Data from 2017 and 2019 are projected. 
c 
Capacity refers to the number of small sized ships and submarines 
that can be repaired at the same time in Callao’s shipyard. 
d 
Private Clients’ Sales are calculated by the formula 



















 7 ships 123MM 16% 2.3% 
2017
b
 11 ships + 1 
submarine 
200MM 40% 5% 
2019
b
 17 ships + 1 
submarine 
300MM 50% 6% 
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Chapter X: Conclusions and Recommendations 
10.1 Conclusions 
The shipbuilding industry is slowly recovering from the world´s financial crisis and 
facing low profits margins and depressed prices. The repairs unit however, has not been 
affected in the same level as ship-owners prefer to repair their vessels rather than buying new 
ones. In addition, increasingly aggressive competition in the world market like China, is 
threatening SIMA´s worldwide position. 
Moreover, SIMA Callao's greatest strength is also its biggest weakness: the 
government's close ties to the company could either push the project forward or deter any 
future opportunity for the potential shipyard.  The small profits SIMA generates inhibits them 
from growing and increasing their capacities. Other weaknesses of the company are related to 
the lack of policies, the obsolete and insufficient infrastructure and the lack of a long-term 
planning. In the other hand, its high skilled and low cost workforce, its ISO certifications a its 
great location should be taken into consideration to formulate its positioning strategy and 
competitive advantages.  
The key problem identified is the small profits that have been obtained in the last 
years. Net margins had been fluctuating around 2.3%. In particular, the type of ownership of 
SIMA (public company) and its social role is restricting its financial results. As suggested by 
the quantitative analysis, there is a potential increase in profits if SIMA increases its capacity 
to serve private clients.  Profit margins could increase at rates around 6% to 7%, taking the 
Chilean Detroit as benchmark.  
Through a fish-bone analysis, the key problem has been broken down into its main 
causes: management, workers, working conditions, materials, machines and infrastructure 
and marketing. First, SIMA´s management is blinded by its social role, impeding them to see 
the economic opportunities. Moreover, there are other problems related to workforce as fixed 
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contracts and highly specialized labor force and the lack of a wage and promotion policy 
based on productivity and results.  Regarding materials, the firm lacks a payment policy and 
does not use financial instruments as letter of credits in their international operations. Also, 
purchasing errors are generating delays and bottlenecks in the process. Furthermore, the 
insufficient and obsolete infrastructure is related to the lack of capacity and the loss of sales 
and clients. Lastly, the company lacks good market intelligence and a clear positioning 
strategy.  
In order to increase profits, SIMA needs to change its focus from the shipbuilding to 
the repair and maintenance industry that offers higher margins. Additionally, the HR division 
must undergo some changes in its policies combined with new action to eliminate the 
problems presented. Some recommended actions are to establish a wage and promotion 
policy based on productivity, train employees in different positions, hire civilians with 
business studies and increase motivation to reduce rotation. Furthermore, a supplier's 
payment policy has to be created, including the use of financial instruments to protect 
international operations. Also, SIMA needs to invest in new equipment and infrastructure 
(expansion of shipyard, construction of new docks, Panamax docks etc.) to increase their 
capacity.  
Lastly, in order to be successful in repair and maintenance, SIMA needs to start from 
the bottom by developing a new business plan. The first parts of the plan have been 
developed in this report, which includes: industry analysis, competitor’s analysis and 
formulation of a positioning strategy. After comparing SIMA to its competitors, it is 
concluded that SIMA offers the best relationship between cost and quality and the best 
location in the region. However, if SIMA wants to increase its competitiveness, a Panamax 
dock is needed plus an increase of capacity for medium and large size vessels.  Also, the firm 
needs to replace its obsolete equipment for high technology in order to guarantee quality and 
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increase productivity. If all the recommendations are performed, then the firm can increase its 
profitability to rates around 6%. 
10.2  Recommendations 
First, in order to shift the firm's focus, it is important for the Strategic Planning 
Manager to convince SIMA´s board of directors and government regulators by explaining the 
social benefits that would be generated with higher profits. Chapter VII can serve as a guide 
to elaborate the arguments.  It is also important to implement changes in the HR division. In 
order to create stability in SIMA’s direction, HR should increase the marine officers labor 
period to at least five years and recruit civilian’s managers with business backgrounds. 
Thereby, the firm could begin thinking strategically, planning long term initiatives and 
investments. 
Workers are essential to guarantee the quality of the service. Thus, the HR division 
needs to motivate the workers by creating incentives and a fair wage and promotion policy 
based on productivity.  It is necessary a salary raise, however SIMA should be careful to keep 
it at a limit where they maintain its cost leadership in the region. Additionally, employees’ 
results could be tracked on a daily/weekly basis and set clear and realistic goals. Also, 
training is essential to create a multi-disciplinary workforce and keep them updated on the 
latest techniques and use of new equipment. 
Also, in order to increase its competitiveness, the management should prioritize 
investments in new equipment and infrastructure, expanding the shipyard for small to large 
size vessels, and building a new dock for Panamax ships.  It is recommended that the 
procurement and operation managers attend The International Workboat Show and The 
Maintenance World Expo 2017 to search for new technologies to improve quality and 
productivity. It is also recommended to invest in an ERP software in order to integrate 
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information across the business units. In addition, procurement and finance policies should be 
implemented to standardize and formalize processes.  
Additionally, a more proactive role of the marketing department is needed. They have 
to start searching for clients now through direct marketing initiatives which are allowed. 
However, SIMA needs to negotiate with the government to eliminate the marketing 
restrictions that have been imposed and that are impeding them on reaching new clients. 
Furthermore, the workout sessions are highly recommended, since employees are the best 
source for identifying problems and finding out solutions. In this way, SIMA’s continuous 
improvement could generate lower costs and higher revenues every year. Also, it is the best 
way to eliminate bureaucracy and speed up processes. 
Finally, the key for keeping the government satisfied is to comply with the projects 
that are required by the navy or other government agency. Also, despite that a shift of focus 
has been recommended, SIMA must continue providing shipbuilding (but in a lower scale), 
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SIMA's Profit and Loss Statement 2015, 2014 
 
 2015 (PEN) 2014 (PEN) 
Revenues   
Revenues from Goods 318,393,204 250,802,432 
Revenues from Services 553,535 111,088 
Total Revenues 318,946,739 250,913,520 
   
Operational Costs -310,240,249 -233,223,422 
Gross Earnings 8,706,490 17,690,098 
   
Sales and Distribution Expenses -1,531,880 -732,379 
Administrative Expenses -27,567,482 -24,589,945 
Other Operating Revenues 2,419,804 1,629,969 
Other Operating Expenses -51,527 -37,050 
Operating Earnings -18,024,595 -6,039,307 
   
Financial Revenues 10,271,370 6,488,202 
Financial Expenses -1,932,091 -1,989,605 
Exchange rate Earnings 43,050,668 15,458,347 
Exchange rate Loses -21,865,500 -4,299,637 
Earnings before Taxes 11,499,872 9,618,000 
   
Sales Taxes -3,914,478 -3,711,523 
Final Result 7,585,394 5,906,477 























SIMA's Unserved Ships During 2011 
 
Client Ship Length 
AMAPE SEYKO 52 - 
AMAPE TOEY 15 - 
TRAMARSA DALMOR II 94 
DOLMAR CARMELA 69 
DOLMAR REYNA DE LA PAZ 81.7 
UMC YING SHUN 368 59.2 
UMC KENYO MARU 1 47.32 
UMC KENYO MARU 2 50.8 
DOLMAR PRIMERO DIOS 30.4 
TRANSGAS VIRGO GAS I 75 
SEGANPORT CERVERA 41 
DOLMAR DRENEC 80.5 
DOLMAR URGORA 49 
MGP FM-53 114 
MGP FM-57 114 
IMI ENERGI 9501 101.8 
MARIT D WORDL XIN SHI JI 8 55.97 
GYOREN KINEI MARU 138 58 
Excelsior Shipping Co. Limited ANGELES B 140 
Note. Data are from “Estudio de Preinversión a Nivel de Perfil: Ampliación de la Capacidad de Reparaciones de 












Table B1 (continuation)  
 
SIMA's Unserved Ships During 2011 
 
 
Client Ship Length 
MARIT OCEANICA HAI ZHI XING 601 38.73 
DOLMAR B/T MONTECRUZ 97 
MARIT DEL WORDL CHENG KAI YU LENG 2 70 
PESQUERA PELAYO DOÑA ADY 41.5 
PESQUERA PELAYO AMAZONAS 26.13 
GYOREN KINEI MARU 88 55 
MARIT OCEANICA HONG YUN Nro. 1 50.5 
MARIT OCEANICA HONG YUN Nro. 3 50.5 
IMI ENERGI 9501 101.8 
AMAPE MARIANE 39.8 
ASIA MARITIMA 05 DONG IL 60.09 
 M/N FRIO CANARIAS 112 
GYOREN ISOMAE MARU 21 53 
GYOREN WAKASHIO 85 70 
DOLMAR CONTADORA 1 83.1 
DOLLMAR LUCILE F 78.85 
CODRALUX DN -  125 51.6 
SEGAMPORT NVO XEIXAL 37.6 
TRAMARSA R/M PACHACAMAC 26.5 
TRAMARSA ALETA AZUL 70 
MGP BAP DUEÑAS 48.6 
TASA TASA 417 38.83 
DOLMAR M/N LA MANCHE 172.1 
Note. Data are from “Estudio de Preinversión a Nivel de Perfil: Ampliación de la Capacidad de Reparaciones de 






Table B1 (continuation) 
 
SIMA's Unserved Ships During 2011 
 
 
Client Ship Length 
OLCESE ADI 05 ExARD-31) 150.6 
SIMAC ADF-107 147 
AMAPE KAIO MARU 81 57.81 
AMAPE KAIO MARU 108 58.6 
IMI BAHIA BAYOVAR 73.02 
MGP BAP UNION 158.9 
PORT LOG GERMCS 120.43 
MARI DEL WORD E/P HAE IN 21 61.09 
MARIT DEL WORDL HUA YING 1 59.96 
SEGAMPORT SIEMPRE SOCIO 38 
DOLMAR CURIMAGUA 76.1 
MARIT DEL WORDL 5 DONG IL 67.9 
COSMOS JULIE L 71.5 
INMARSA R/M NEPTUNO 30.5 
Note. Data are from “Estudio de Preinversión a Nivel de Perfil: Ampliación de la Capacidad de Reparaciones de 
Naves  de Bajo y Medio Bordo del Astillero de SIMA-CALLAO” by C. Novoa, 2012.  
 
 
